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Hannah and McLaughlin: The Ninth Circuit & the Supreme Court

COMMENT
"ON CERTIORARI TO THE NINTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS":
THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF
NINTH CIRCUIT CASES DURING THE
OCTOBER 2006 TERM
INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit has long been viewed as being in conflict with
the Supreme Court. 1 Critics have pointed to controversial rulings and a
high rate of reversal. 2 In the October 2006 Supreme Court term, which
ran from October 2006 to July 2007, cases on certiorari to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals were a substantial part of the Supreme Court's
docket. During this term, the Supreme Court issued seventy-one
opinions, with twenty-two - or 30% - corning from the Ninth Circuit. 3
I CJ, Akhil R. Amar & Vikram D. Amar, Does the Supreme Court Hate the Ninth Circuit?
A Dialogue On Why That Appeals Court Fares So Poorly, Apr. 19, 2002, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020419.htm!.
2 See e.g., Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show (radio broadcast Nov. 3, 2005)
(stating "The 9th Circus, the most reversed circuit court of appeals in the country.") (emphasis
added); but see e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. I, (2003) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is neither far to the left nor disproportionately
reversed); accord. Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 355 (2006).
3 See Rupal Doshi, Supreme COllrt of the United States October Term 2006 Overview,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER SUPREME COURT INSTITUTE, 10, Table I (June 29, 2007);
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the court, LA TIMES, July II, 2007, at A15. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals is the largest of the thirteen circuit courts, id., and its jurisdiction includes nine
states, forty percent of the nation's land mass, and nearly sixty million people. Hon. John M. Roll,
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With thirteen circuit courts of appeal, this was a disproportionately large
percentage, even when the large geographic size and substantial
population of the Ninth Circuit is taken into account. 4
Whether reversed, affirmed, vacated, or remanded, a review of the
interaction between the two courts over twenty-two cases reveals several
fundamental differences between the two courts on key issues. This
Comment examines these differences by exploring twenty of those
decisions and how they illustrate the relationship between the Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court. 5 Part I examines the decisions that arose
from the Supreme Court's review of Ninth Circuit decisions. Part II ties
these decisions and conclusions into a larger motif emerging between the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court, and Part III ultimately concludes that
the future is likely to continue to see disagreements between the two
courts.

I.

INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COURTS

The twenty Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the U.S. Supreme
Court involved varying subject matters and an assortment of issues. The
Supreme Court showed special interest in cases involving habeas corpus
and Constitutional issues. The Court reviewed seven habeas petition
cases and four Constitutional law cases. 6 The Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit on five of the seven habeas petition cases and all of the

The ll5·Year-Old Ninth Circuit-Why a Split Is Necessary and Inevitable, 7 WYO. L. REV. 109, 110
(2007). This is nearly one-fifth of the American population. The next busiest court of appeals, the
Fifth Circuit which includes Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, saw the Supreme Court review only
five cases in the October 2006 term. See Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the court, LA TIMES, July I I,
2007, at A15.
4 Crystal Marchesoni, "United We Stand, Divided We Fall"?: The Controversy Surrounding
A Possible Division of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 37 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 1263, 1269 (2005); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the court, L.A. TIMES, July 11,2007, at
A15; see also Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial
Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 I, 718 (2000); but see Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most
Maligned Circuit in the Country-Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465 (1997).
5 This article will only look at twenty of the cases on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals during the Supreme Court's October 2006 term because two cases were procedural
anomalies, which fail to add substance to the discussion of the relationship between the two courts.
The cases which will therefore not be discussed in this article are Purcell v. Gonzalez,-U.S. - , 127
S. Ct. 5 (2007) (on appeal to the Supreme Court from two judge motions panel of Ninth Circuit) and
Limtiaco v. Camacho,-U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1413 (2007) (on appeal from Guam Supreme Court to
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court; Supreme Court reversed holding that limitations period for
filing appeal did not start running until Ninth Circuit dismissed).
6 See sections I (A) and I (B), infra.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss3/4

2

Hannah and McLaughlin: The Ninth Circuit & the Supreme Court

2008] THE NINTH CIRCUIT & THE SUPREME COURT

411

Constitutional law cases. 7 The Supreme Court also reviewed two key
immigration cases, and cases involving employment law, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, communications, environmental law, bankruptcy, antitrust, and price fixing. 8 These decisions reveal certain common threads
emerging between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in the course
of the latter's October 2006 term.

A.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF HABEAS, PETITIONS FROM THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

On its journey from a prerogative wnt ill medieval England,9
through its recognition in the United States Constitution,1O the writ of
habeas corpus had ingrained itself into modern American jurisprudence.
It is quite simply a legal procedure, in which the lawfulness of a
prisoner's detention is collaterally challenged in front of a new judicial
body by way of a civil action.

1. Summary of Cases

a. Ayers v. Belmontes
In 1982 Fernando Belmontes was tried and convicted of firstdegree murder, and was subsequently sentenced to death. I I During
sentencing, Belmontes presented evidence purporting to show that he
would contribute positively to society while serving a life sentence, and
that he had previously done so while under the supervision of the
California Youth Authority. 12 After closing arguments, the trial judge
instructed the jury to consider certain factors either as aggravating or
mitigating, including "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." 13

7

/d.

B u.s.

v. Resendiz·Ponce, 549 U.s. _, 127 S.Ct. 782 (2007); Gonzales v. Duenas·Alvarez,
549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 815 (2007); see section II, infra.
9 See generally, WILLIAM F. DUNKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Greenwood Press 1980) (1980).
IO U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
II Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 469,472 (2006).
12 [d. at 473.
13 [d. at 472-73.
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This factor was, at the time codified at California Penal Code section
190.3(k), and was referred to as "factor (k).,,14
Mter exhausting his state remedies, Belmontes filed for a writ of
habeas corpus. 15 Belmontes argued that factor (k) prevented the jury
from considering his forward-looking evidence. 16 The district court
denied the petition, and a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision. 17 An equally divided panel denied rehearing en
banc. 18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth
Circuit's decision for further consideration in light of Brown v. Pay ton. 19
Returning to the Ninth Circuit, another divided panel again invalidated
Belmontes' sentence by distinguishing Payton. 20 The Ninth Circuit held
that Payton was distinguishable because the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") 21 applied in that case,22 while it
was inapplicable to Belmontes' petition. 23 Again, a divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 24 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari for a second time. 25
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of factor (k)
was "too confined" because the Ninth Circuit read this factor to "allow[]
the jury to consider evidence that bears upon the commission of the
crime .... ,,26 However, the Supreme Court explained that the factor
directed the jury to consider any other circumstance that might excuse
the crime, not just any other circumstance of the crime that might
mitigate his culpability.27 So although the Ninth Circuit was correct that
AEDPA was inapplicable to Belmontes' claims, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed Payton without reviewing its factor (k) precedent, which held
that "reading factor (k) to preclude consideration of post-crime evidence
would require the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to
lessen or excuse a crime.,,28 The Court noted that this interpretation was

14

[d. at 472.

15

[d. at 472.

16

[d. at 472.

Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. _,127 S.C!. 469,472 (2006).
[d. at 472 (denying rehearing en bane).
[d. at 472; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
20
Ayers, 127 S.Ct. at 472 (2006).
21 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (Westlaw 2008).
22 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (Westlaw 2008).
23
Ayers, 127 S.Ct. at 472.
24 [d. at 472.
25 [d. at 472-73.
26 [d. at 475.
27 [d. at 475.
17

18
19

28

[d. at 475 (internal quotations omitted).
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consistent with the evidence presented at the hearings, the parties'
closing arguments, and the other instructions from the trial court. 29
As such, the Court held that "[i]t is implausible that the jury supposed
that past deeds pointing to a constructive future could not extenuate the
gravity of the crime, as required by factor (k), much less that such
evidence could not be considered at all.,,30
b. Carey v. Musladin

During Mathew Musladin's trial, which resulted in a conviction
for fIrst-degree murder,3l members of the victim's family sat in the front
row and wore buttons with a photo of the victim on the buttons. 32
Musladin appealed his conviction, arguing that the buttons deprived him
of his Constitutional rights. 33
A state appellate court affIrmed
Musladin's conviction, stating that although the practice of "wearing of
photographs of victims in a courtroom ... should be discouraged," the
buttons had not "branded [Musladin] with an unmistakable mark of guilt
in the eyes of the jurors.,,34 The court reasoned that, under Holbrook v.
Flynn,35 the photographs of the victim were "unlikely to have been taken
as a sign of anything other than the normal grief occasioned by the loss
of [a] family member. ,,36
Musladin applied for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court arguing that the buttons were inherently prejudicial and deprived
him of a fair trial. 37 The district court denied Musladin's application, and
Musladin appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 38 The Ninth Circuit, applying
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provision
requiring that a writ of habeas corpus only be issued when the trial
unreasonably applied or resulted in a decision contrary to "clearly
established federal law", concluded that Estelle v. Williams 39 and
Holbrook v. Flynn 40 established the test for inherent prejudice applicable

29

Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. _,127 S.C!. 469,475-76 (2006).
478.

30 1d. at

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 649, 651 (2006).
at 651-52.
33 1d. at 652.

31

32/d.

34
35

Id. at 652.

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986).
at 652; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 649, 651 (2006).
37
Carey, 127 S.Ct. at 652.
38 1d. at 652.
39 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 50 1,503-06 (1976).
40 Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 56 (1986).
36 1d.
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to Musladin's claim. 41 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the state
court's application of Flynn, but not Williams, "was contrary to clearly
established federal law and constituted an unreasonable application of
that law.'.42
On review, the Supreme Court fIrst noted that section 2254(d)(l)
of AEDPA, where it refers to "clearly established Federal law," refers to
Supreme Court holdings, as opposed to dicta. 43 Next, the Court pointed
out that Williams and Flynn dealt with inherent prejudice produced by
government-sponsored practices, not spectator conduct: "[i]ndeed, part
of the legal test of Williams and Flynn-asking whether the practices
furthered an essential state interest-suggests that those cases apply only
to state-sponsored practices.,,44 The court reversed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit, holding that the lack of applicable precedent regarding
unreasonable spectator conduct made it impossible to say that the state
court unreasonably applied clearly established Federallaw. 45
c. Whorton v. Bockting

In Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court again reviewed the
Ninth Circuit's decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus, this time
requested by Marvin Bockting. 46 Bockting was convicted of three counts
of sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen. 47 Although
Bockting's alleged six-year-old victim was unable to recount the assault
allegations at trial, the trial court allowed the prosecution to call a
detective and the victim's mother to recount the victim's previous
allegations. 48 After exhausting his state remedies, Bockting ftled a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in district court challenging the Nevada
Supreme Court's affIrmation of Bockting' s conviction. 49
The district court denied the petition, and Bockting appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. 50 While the petition was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court held in Cra~ord v. Washington that "[t]estimonial
41 Carey, 127 S.Ct. at 652, 649, 651; Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 657-58 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990)) See also 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d)(1).
42 Carey, 127 S.Ct. at 652; Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
43 Carey, 127 S.Ct. at652 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)).
44 /d. at 653-54.
45 [d. at 654.

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007).
[d. at 1178.
48 [d. at 1178.
49 [d. at 1178-79.
50 [d. at 1179.
46

47
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statements of witnesses absent from trial" are admissible "only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].,,51 In granting the petition,
the Ninth Circuit held that Crawford applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review because it announced a watershed rule that "rework[ed]
our understanding of bedrock criminal procedure. ,,52 In reviewing this
decision, the Supreme Court held that Crawford applied a new rule,
which did not qualify for watershed status, and therefore the Crawford
holding did not apply retroactively, reversing the decision of the Ninth
Circuit. 53
d. Schriro v. Landrigan

In Schriro v. Landrigan, Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan was
previously convicted of multiple crimes. 54 After escaping his Oklahoma
prison, Landrigan murdered Chester Dean Dyer in Arizona during the
course of a burglary.55 A jury found Landrigan guilty of theft, seconddegree burglary, and felony murder.56 At his sentencing hearing, the trial
judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances and two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, but nevertheless sentenced him to
death. 57 Consistent with his defiant statements at his sentencing hearing,
Landrigan filed a petition to set aside his conviction and sentencing. 58
Among his arguments, Landrigan claimed that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. 59
After exhausting his attempts to set aside his conviction and
sentence at the state level, Landrigan filed a petition of writ of habeas
corpus under AED P A. 60 The federal district court dismissed Landrigan's
1d. at 1179 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004».
52 Whorton, 127 S.C!. at 1180 (2007) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004».
53 Whorton., 127 S.C!. at 1181-84 (2007).
54 State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d III, 114 (Ariz. 1993); Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221,
1223 (9th Cir. 2001), affd en bane, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bea, C., and Callahan, C.,
dissenting), rev'd 550 U.S. _,127 S.C!. 1933 (2007).
55 Landrigan, 859 P.2d at 114 (Ariz. 1993).
56 1d. at 4.
57 Landrigan, 127 S.C!. at 1938 (2007) (aggravating circumstances included Landrigan's
expectation of a pecuniary gain when murdering Dyer and his previous felony convictions, while
mitigating circumstances included his family's love and lack of premeditation).
58 See Landrigan, 859 P.2d at 117 (Ariz. 1993) (citing various excerpts from Landrigan's
sentencing hearing).
59 1d. at 8 (Landrigan's other arguments in his post-conviction petition include a failure to
grant a motion for acquittal and new trial, failure to instruct the jury on a lesser degree of homicide,
and violations of his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights).
60 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l) (Westlaw 2008); Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 641-42 (9th Cir. 2006)
51
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petition without holding an evidentiary hearing because he had failed to
demonstrate any prejudice as a result of his attorney's actions. 61 After a
three-judge panel affirmed that denial,62 the Ninth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc and reversed. 63 Turning to the issue of Landrigan's
evidentiary hearing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
abused its discretion in denying such a hearing in part because
Landrigan's instructions to his attorney were taken out of context. 64 The
court stated that "Landrigan tried and failed, through no fault of his own,
to develop the facts supporting his ineffective assistance claim at the
state-court level. He is therefore not precluded by AEDPA from seeking
an evidentiary hearing in federal court.,,65
Because an evidentiary hearing on Landrigan's claims was not
barred under AEDP A, the Court of Appeals turned to the merits of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, reviewing under the framework
of Strickland v. Washington. 66 First, the Court of Appeals concluded that
his attorney's initial investigation revealed evidence that may have
mitigated Landrigan's sentence, if it had been developed further. 67 Since
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Landrigan had established some basis to
find his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate and discover
mitigating evidence, it next turned to the prejudicial impact it had on
Landrigan. 68 The Court of Appeals determined that Landrigan might
have been prejudiced when considering evidence discussed at trial and
the evidence presented in Landrigan's habeas proceedings under Wiggins
v. Smith. 69 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Landrigan had a
"colorable claim" for ineffective assistance of counsel if he could prove

(en bane rehearing).
61 /d. at 641-42.
62 Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1221 (9th Cir. 200 I).
63/d. at 1235 (deferring submission of decision pending the en bane decision in Summerlin
v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005)).
64 Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 642-43, 647 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane rehearing).
65 1d. at 643.
66 Id. at 643 (citing from Supreme Court precedent and requiring Landrigan to "demonstrate
that his counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and that there is
a reasonable probability that counsel's unprofessional errors 'undermine confidence in the outcome
of the proceeding.'" (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984))).
67 Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 644 (en bane rehearing) Evidence initially discovered but not
developed further included a psychological recommendation, findings of a private investigator,
specific facts about Landrigan's birth-mother's substance abuse, and a letter from Landrigan's birth
mother.
68 Id. at 648.
69 Id. (interpreting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,534 (2003)).
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the facts alleged in his habeas petition were true; thus, the case was
remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 7o
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and decided that
the district court did not abuse its discretion. 71 Under AEDPA, a federal
court is called upon to determine if the state court was unreasonable in
its application of Supreme Court precedent or analysis of evidence
presented at trial. 72 Only if the federal court concludes that a prisoner
could "prove [his or her] factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle
[him or her] to federal habeas relief' should an evidentiary hearing be
granted; 73 however, the state court's decision must be presumed correct
and rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 74 The Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's reading of Landrigan's sentencing hearing transcript
and found that no abuse of discretion existed because Landrigan
"'instructed his attorney not to bring any mitigation to the attention of the
[sentencing] court,'" much of which overlapped with the evidence he
presented in his defense. 75
The Court next attacked the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Strickland. First, the Court found that it was objectively reasonable for
the sentencing court to conclude that Landrigan's rejection of mitigating
evidence could not establish any prejudice pursuant to Strickland. 76
Second, the Court found that Landrigan's decision to not present
mitigating evidence might have been made knowingly and intelligently,
but nevertheless avoided the issue in part because Landrigan failed to
argue the issue in state court. 77 Lastly, the Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that Landrigan had a "colorable claim" for
ineffective assistance of counsel and assigned greater deference to the
district court's determination. 78 The Court opined that the district court
had reason to conclude that the exclusion of additional evidence would
not have directly resulted in a different sentence for Landrigan. 79 As a

70 Landrigan, 441 F.3d at 650 (en bane rehearing) (applying Earp v. Omoski, 431 F.3d 1158,
1170-73 (9th Cir. 2005)).
71 Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1937 (2007) (Stevens, J., Souter, D., Ginsburg, R., and Breyer, J.,
dissenting) .
72 [d. at 1939 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and referencing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
410 (2000)) (emphasis added).
73 Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1940 (2007).
74 [d. at 1939-40 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1 )).
75 Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1941-42 (2007).
76 [d. at 1942.
77 [d. at 1942-43 (rejecting an "informed and knowing" requirement for defendants who
decide not to introduce evidence).
78 [d. at 1943-44.
79 [d. at 1943-44.
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result, the district court's denial of Landrigan's habeas corpus petition
was affrrmed 80 and Landrigan is currently on death row at the Arizona
Department of Corrections. 81
e. Uttecht v. Brown

The fifth habeas corpus case stemmed from four days in May 1991
during which Cal Coburn Brown robbed, raped, and tortured two women
in Washington and California. 82 Brown slit both of his victims' throats,
killing one. 83 Brown was sentenced to life in prison by a California state
court after he pled guilty to charges of attempted murder in the first
degree, aggravated mayhem, torture, robbery in the frrst degree, and false
imprisonment. 84 Brown was also tried in Washington for the first-degree
murder of Holly Washa, resulting in Brown's death sentence. 85 After
exhausting his state appeals, Brown petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. Brown raised several issues in his petition,
including the assertions that Washington's death penalty statutes is
facially unconstitutional, the dismissal of three jurors was improper, and
Brown's attorney was ineffective as counse1. 86 The district court denied
Brown's petition;87 however, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. 88
The Ninth Circuit's reversal focused on the second issue raised:
the allegedly improper dismissal of three jurors,89 with special attention
paid to the .dismissal of a particular juror-juror z.90 The Ninth Circuit

Landrigan, 501 F.3d at 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
Arizona Department of Corrections Death Row Inmate Profiles, available at
http://www.azcorrections.govlDeathRowlProfilesBase.asp?inmate=LandriganJ (last visited Mar. 3,
2008).
82 State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529,555-59 (Wash., 1997) ..
80

81

83/d.
84
85

[d. at 548.
[d. at 549-50.

86 Brown v. Lambert, 431 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2005) (opinion superseded at 451 F.3d 946
after denial ofrehearing en bane) (Tallman, J.; O'Scannlain, J.; Kleinfeld, J.; Callahan, J.; and Bea,
J. dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
87 Brown v. Lambert, W.D. Wash. (Sept. 15,2004) (slip copy).
88 Brown, 431 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (opinion superseded at 451 F.3d 946 after denial of
rehearing en bane) (Tallman, ., O'Scannlain, ., Kleinfeld, ., Callahan ., Bea, ., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en bane).
89 Brown v. Lambert, 451 F.3d 946, 947-48 and 954-55 (9th CiT. 2005) (citing Campbell v.
Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1464 (9th CiT. 1987) to find the death penalty statue was previously
upheld, and determining Brown will have an "opportunity to receive effective assistance of counsel"
upon a sentencing rehearing following the standard in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123-24
(1976)).
90 Brown, 451 F.3d at 948-49 (9th CiT. 2005) (holding the dismissal of juror X was proper
because she could not vote for a death sentence, and juror Y was properly dismissed for obvious
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held that the exclusion of juror Z was improper because juror Z could
have followed the rule of law and imposed the death penalty.91 The
majority compared juror Z to the juror held to have been improperly
dismissed in Gray v. Mississippi and found that juror Z gave a stronger
affIrmative answer when asked if he could apply the rule of law.92 The
majority also rejected any deference to the trial judge because, in the
majority's view, juror Z had clearly stated his ability to impose the death
penalty and no ambiguity was present. 93
In reviewing its precedent, the Supreme Court articulated four
principles to be applied on appeal: (1) "criminal defendant[s have] the
right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in
favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for
cause," (2) states have "a strong interest in having jurors who are able to
apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes," (3)
jurors can be excused for cause if his or her ability to impose the death
penalty under state law is "substantially impaired," and (4) the trial
court's decision to remove a juror based in part on his or her demeanor
should be given deference by subsequent courtS. 94
The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit erroneously
reviewed the Washington Supreme Court's decision. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the Washington Supreme Court's opinion was not
contrary to the principals noted above. 95 Most importantly, the Court
attacked the Ninth Circuit's lack of deference to the trial court and stated
that reviewing courts "owe deference to the trial court" because it is in a
fitter position to identify an impaired juror. 96
f. Burton v. Stewart
In Burton v. Stewart, Burton was originally sentenced to 562
months in prison for rape, robbery, and burglary.97 Burton requested
impairments).
91 /d. at 948-52 (drawing from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968); see Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658 (1987)).
92 Brown, 451 F.3d at 950-51 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648
(1987).
93 Brown, 451 F.3d at 952 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that trial court deference to juror
demeanor "can only shed light [when] ambiguous language" exists).
94 Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. _
, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 (2007) (drawing from Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968) and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416, 442, 424-434
(1985)).
95 Brown, 127 S.C!. at 2228 (2007).
96 Id. at 2229-31.
97 Button v. Stewart, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 793, 794 (2007).
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resentencing after an unrelated prior conviction was overturned. 98 While
state review of Burton's resentencing was pending, Burton filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in district court disputing the
constitutionality of his three convictions, but not his sentence. 99 The
district court denied relief, and the Ninth Circuit affIrmed. 100
Three years after filing the initial habeas petition, Burton filed a
second habeas petition, this time contesting his sentence. 101 Again, the
district court denied relief, and the Ninth Circuit affIrmed.102 Both courts
also found that the district court exercised proper jurisdiction, although
Burton did not seek or obtain authorization to file the second habeas
petition-a requirement for subsequent habeas petitions under
AEDPA I03
The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Blakely
v. Washington applied retroactively on collateral review, but instead
vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit on procedural grounds, holding
that Burton's second petition was barred by AEDP A. 104 The Court held
that the second petition was barred because Burton was being held in
custody pursuant to the 1998 judgment at the time he filed both habeas
petitions. 105 Because Burton failed to obtain authorization to file a
second or successive habeas petition pursuant to AEDPA, the district
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second petition, and therefore
the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 106

g. Fry v. Pliler
Finally, Fry v. Pliler stemmed from the murder of James and
Cynthia Bell in central California on October 27, 1992. 107 John Francis
Fry was charged with their murders, and after his third jury trial, Fry was
convicted of two counts of fIrst-degree murder. 108 While incarcerated,
Fry filed an application for writ of habeas cOrpUS. I09 Fry challenged his
1d. at 795.
ld.
100 Id.
IOl
ld.
98
99

102
103

Id. at 796.

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 793, 796 (2007).

Id. at 794-96.
105 1d. at 796.

104

Id. at 799.
Fry v. Pliler, No. Civ. SOl I 580FCDGGHP, at 5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2004) (slip copy).
108 /d. at 4 (Fry's conviction was also affirmed by the California Court of Appeals and the
California Supreme Court).
109 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (Westlaw 2008); Fry, No. Civ. SOl I 580FCDGGHP, at I (E.D. Cal.
106

107
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custody in part because the testimony of Pamela Marie Maples was
excluded during his third jury trial. 110 Maples was the cousin of Anthony
Hurtz, who Fry asserted had confessed to the killing of James and
Cynthia Bell. 111 Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California denied Fry's petition in full. 112
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Maple's testimony was
'''material and would have substantially bolstered [Fry's] claims of
innocence'" because she was sufficiently reliable and overheard Hurtz's
confession of a double homicide. 113 Even so, the Ninth Circuit applied
Brecht v. Abrahamson and found the exclusion of Maple's testimony
was "harmless.,,114 Under the Brecht test, an error is harmless unless it
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict.,,1l5 Despite Fry's argument that the Brecht test should not
be applied because the California Court of Appeals never conducted a
prejudice review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas
corpus application. 116
The Supreme Court struggled with the application of the
Chapman v. California and Brecht tests for harmless error. ll7 Under the
Chapman test, federal constitutional error is harmless if a court is "able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."ll8
Left unanswered by Chapman was what test should be used by a federal
court on collateral review of a habeas corpus application if no finding of
error is made at the state appellate court level. This is precisely the issue
the Court took under review. 119 In affIrming the Ninth Circuit's
dismissal of Fry's petition, the Supreme Court stated that Federal courts
reviewing § 2254 habeas corpus applications must apply the Brecht test:

Aug. 27, 2004) (slip copy).
1I0 1d. at 24 (Fry contended other violations of his Sixth Amendment and Due Process rights,
including improper admission of character evidence, admission of coerced testimony, undue
restriction of cross examination of witnesses, prohibition of presenting prior criminal convictions of
Anthony Hurtz, improper jury instructions, and improperly edited testimony submitted to the jury
during deliberations).
1IIId.at24.
112 1d. at I.
113 Fry v. Pliler, 209 Fed. Appx. 622, 624 (9th Cir., 2006) (citing Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d
997, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004)).
114 Fry, 209 Fed. Appx. at 624 (9th Cir. 2006).
115
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
116 Fry, 209 Fed. Appx. at 624 (9th Cir. 2006).
117 Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 2321 (2007), petition for rehearing denied 128 S.Ct.
19 (2007).
118 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,87 (1967).
119
Fry, 127 S.Ct. at 2325.
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"whether or not the state appellate court" performed an analysis under
the Chapman test. 120
Two broad themes arise from these seven cases - one procedural
and the other substantive. First, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
have differing opinions when it comes to federalism. The former viewed
state power more expansively while the latter was more willing to restrict
it by granting habeas relief. Second, the two courts are also at odds
regarding individual liberties. Converse to the federalism impacts, here
the Supreme Court appears to be the restrictor, while the Ninth Circuit is
the liberator.

2.

The Courts' Decisions and the Impact on Federalism

One of the bedrock concepts of American government is the
delineation of powers between the federal government and the states, i.e.,
the legal relationship called federalism. 121 Habeas corpus relief can be
viewed as an anomaly within this framework because it invites a federal
court to second-guess a state's exercise of its power to punish
criminals. 122 It has thus been a matter of dispute whether federal habeas
corpus is l23 or is not a direct attack on federalism. 124 The seven Ninth
Circuit habeas corpus cases reviewed by the Supreme Court in 2006,
illustrate that the two courts have differing views regarding federalism,
as their decisions had contrary impacts on a state's ability to punish its
criminals.
In all seven cases, the respective state judicial systems sentenced
the prisoners and upheld their imprisonments. 125 Likewise, in all seven
120

Fry, 127 S.Ct. at 2328.
See e.g., Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 493 (1932) ("Thus, in our dual system of
government, action of the one government in the proper exercise of its sovereign powers, regarded
as innocuous and permissible notwithstanding its incidental effects on the other, may become
offensive and be deemed forbidden if it discriminates against the other.").
122 It is recognized that the invitation is to allow the federal judiciary to enforce certain rights
that are within its power to do so; however, the issue of individual liberties is addressed in the
following subsection. For purposes of this subsection, second-guessing a state's police power refers
pure I y to the mechanical process.
123 Cj, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (reviewing a writ of habeas corpus
form the State of Virginia, Justice S. O'Connor begins the Court's opinion with: "This is a case
about federalism.").
124
See e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LmERTY, 147 et seq. (New York University Press 2001) (2001).
125 People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744 (Cal. 1988); see Mus1adin v. LaMarque, 403 F.3d
1072 (9th Cir. 2005); Bockting v. State, 105 Nev. 1023 (Nev. 1989); State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1
(Ariz. 1993); State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529 (Wash., 1997); State v. Burton, 133 Wash. 2d 1025
(Wash. 1997); Fry v. Pliler, No. Civ. S011580FCDGGHP, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2004).
121
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cases the District Courts denied the prisoner's habeas corpus petition. 126
The Ninth Circuit reversed in all but two cases, holding that a writ of
habeas corpus should be granted or the case remanded for further
proceedings.127 In each of these decisions the state's power was
effectively supplanted and assumed by the federal jUdiciary.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decisions in five of the seven cases. 128 But in every decision the court
favored the rejection of federal habeas corpus relief. In all seven cases,
only Justices Breyer, Souter, Ginsberg, and Steven proffered any
dissenting opinions. 129 Even so, only three cases were not unanimous. 130
Many of the majority decisions are littered with language that expresses
a preference for state poweL I31 By declining to involve the federal
judiciary in a state's punishment oif its criminals, the Court expressed a
more restrained understanding of federalism with respect to federal
power than the Ninth Circuit.
At first glance, two of the cases--Burton and Fry-- do not neatly
fit into this framework because none of the federal courts - the district
courts, the Ninth Circuit, nor the Supreme Court -favored granting a
writ. However, these two cases, like the others, comport with the
Supreme Court's view on federalism with respect to habeas corpus ..
Habeas relief was denied by all courts in Burton on jurisdictional
grounds. Similarly, in Fry the Ninth Circuit wrote only a four-page
opinion summarily applying the Brecht harmless error test. 132 Justice
Scalia later wrote a majority opinion in which he avoided the Ninth
Circuit's application of the Brecht test. 133 Instead he narrowly framed
the opinion as to whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in applying the

126 Belmontes v. Calderon, No. CIVS890736DFLJFM, slip op. (E.D. Cal. May 14,2001); see
Musladin v. LaMarque, 403 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); Bockting v. Bayer, No. CV-N-98-0764-ECR
(VPC), slip op. (D. Nev. Mar. 19,2002); Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2006);
Brown v. Lambert, No. COI-715C, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15,2004); Burton v. Waddington,
No. C02-140L, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17,2002); Fry v. Pliler, No. Civ. SOl I 580FCDGGHP,
slip op. (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2004).
127 See section I(A)(I), supra.
128 Ayers, 127 S.C!. 469 (2006); Carey, 127 S.C!. 649 (2006); Whorton, 127 S.Ct. 1173
(2007); Landrigan, 127 S.C!. 1933 (2007); Brown, 127 S.C!. 2218 (2007).
129 Ayers, 127 S.C!. 469 (2006); Landrigan, 127 S.C!. 1933 (2007); Brown, 127 S.C!. 2218
(2007).
130 Carey, 127 S.Ct. 649 (2006); Whorton, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007); Burton, 127 S.Ct. 793
(2007); Fry, 127 S.C!. 2321 (2007).
131 See e.g., Brown, 127 S.Ct. at 2223 ("[Rleviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial
court.").
132 Fry, 209 Fed. Appx. 622 (9th Cir. 2006).
133 Fry, 127 S.C!. at 2328 (2007).
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test in the first place, rather than whether it was applied correctly. 134
Collectively, these two cases do not weaken the different approaches to
federalism simply because they enjoyed uniform denial of a habeas
corpus petition.
The Supreme Court, to a greater extent than the Ninth Circuit,
favors the state's power in so far as it relates to the punishment of
criminals. Aside from the habeas corpus impacts on federalism, the
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit also took differing positions as it
related to individual liberties.

3.

The Courts' Decisions and the Impacts on Individual Liberties

One analyst has stated that "Habeas Corpus is the structural
reform mechanism of the criminal justice system, functioning to provide
an avenue to vindicate substantive rights.,,135 If this statement is correct,
then refusing to grant a petition may therefore function to censure
individual liberties. 136 If no genuine impact on individual liberties
actually occurred then the denial of habeas relief is moot. But to first
conclude the existence of a violation is relative and not absolute.
Reviewing the discrepancies between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court, where the former found such violations while the latter did not,
leads to the conclusion that there is a difference in the courts' perceptions
of when individual liberties are violated.
In Ayers, Landrigan, Carey, Whorton, and Uttecht, the Ninth
Circuit found enough of a violation of individual liberties to grant habeas
relief or remand the case for further proceedings. Unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court found no such violation in any of the seven

Id. at 2328.
135 WILLIAM F. DUNKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS, 3 (Greenwood
Press 1980) (1980); see also Margery I. Miller, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA 's
"Adjudicated on the Merits" Clause When Habeas Corpus is Understood as an Appellate Function
of the Federal Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2593, 2594 (2004) ("The ability of a state prisoner to
petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus is an important way in which our criminal justice
system protects the right of individuals to obtain relief when they have been unjustly imprisoned.");
Ezra Spilke, Adjudicated on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires State Courts to Exhibit Their
Reasoning, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 995, 1012 (2006) ("The requirement to examine the reasoning
of a state court decision is the soundest way to guarantee the viability of habeas corpus as a
meaningful protector of individual rights."); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS.
L. REv. 1165, 1197 et seq. (2007).
136 For purposes of this subsection, individual liberties are synonymous with substantive and
civil rights because all three are affected by a decision to deny or grant habeas relief. Furthermore,
the umbrella of individual liberties comprises a broad range of rights.
134
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cases. 137 Again, one could point to Burton and Fry because neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court found a violation of individual
liberties sufficient to grant habeas relief. However, these two cases are
unique because Burton was decided on jurisdictional grounds and Fry
was extremely limited in its holding, and thus do not impact this analysis.
The two courts' decisions thus reflect their contradictory findings
on individual liberties. While it appears that the Ninth Circuit is more
favorable to expanding individual liberties, the Supreme Court appears to
be of a different view- raising the bar for finding violations of
individual liberties. Future application of the Court's precedent stands to
restrict individual liberties with respect to state prisoners.
Notwithstanding this contrariety over prisoners' rights, the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court also appear to disagree over individual liberties
in a greater range of Constitutional law cases.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES FROM
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

While the Supreme Court's review of habeas cases from the Ninth
Circuit evinces a recognition for greater state power and a resulting
limitation on the established range of individual liberties, the Court's
review of Constitutional law cases adds some light to these conclusions
as well. The Court reviewed four Constitutional law cases from the
Ninth Circuit: Gonzales v. Carhart (Planned Parenthood); Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No.1; Morse v.
Frederick; and California v. Rettele. 138 In three of these four cases, the
Ninth Circuit's holding favored an acknowledgement or enlargement of
individual liberties, and in these three cases the Supreme Court reversed,
finding in favor of the governmental authority. The one outlier-Parents
Involved-did not result in a favorable holding for the governmental
authority, but it did result in a holding that substantially limits a school
district's ability to establish effective affirmative action plans in primary
and secondary education. 139

See section I (A)( I). supra.
138 Gonzales v. Carhart. 549 U.S. _. 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007); Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School Dis!. No. I. 551 U.S. _. 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007); Morse v. Frederick. 551
U.S. _. 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007); Los Angeles County. California v. Rettele. 550 U.S. _. 127 S.Ct.
1989 (2007).
139 Parents Involved. 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007).
137
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Summary of Cases

a. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1
Parents Involved concerned a challenge to the Seattle school
district's voluntary adoption of a student assignment plan that relied
upon race to allocate students among the different public schools. 14O The
Seattle school district classified students as either white or nonwhite for
the purposes of allocating students among its public high schools. 141
Although Seattle has never historically operated racially segregated
schools, the objective of this classification was to remedy segregated
housing patterns. 142
Parents Involved in Community Schools ("Parents Involved") is a
non-profit corporation made up of the parents of students who had been
or would be "denied assignment to their chosen high school because of
their race.,,143 Parents Involved sued, alleging that this use of race
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Washington Civil Rights
Act. 144
Because of the issues involved, both state and federal courts
reviewed the case before it went to the Supreme Court. The Western
District of Washington first held that the school district's use of race
survived strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the
plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 145
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision based on the
Washington Civil Rights Act, but then vacated the decision and certified
the state law question to the Washington Supreme Court. l46 The
Washington Supreme Court held that the state civil rights act did not bar
"[p]rograrns which are racially neutral, such as the [district's] open
choice plans.,,147 Then, back in the Ninth Circuit, a second panel

140 Id. at 2738. The case was consolidated with Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of
Education from the Sixth Circuit.
141 Id. at 2746.
142 Id. at 2747.
143 Id. at 2748.
144 Id.
145 Id . at 2748; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I, 137
F. Supp. 2d 1224,1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001); see generally Katie York, What Does Diversity Mean in
Seattle?: Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 Strikes Down
the Use o/a Racial Tiebreaker, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 68-70 (2005).
146
Parents Involved,127 S.Ct. at 2748; Parents Involved, 294 F.3d at 1087.
147 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2738 (citing Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
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reversed the district court, this time holding that the schools district's
plan was not narrowly tailored to achieve the district's interest in racial
diversity under the Equal Protection Clause. 148 The Ninth Circuit
reheard the case before an en banc panel and this time affirmed the
district court's original decision. 149
After granting certiorari and hearing oral argument, the Supreme
Court issued a decision on the final day of its October 2006 term. 150 The
Court first noted that it had previously recognized two compelling
interests in racial classifications in education: 1) the interest in
"remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination" and 2) "the
interest in diversity in higher education.,,151 The Court then went on to
explain that the compelling diversity interest upheld in Grutter v.
Bollinger focused not only on race or ethnicity, but on "a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element.,,152 Essentially, the admissions
program in Grutter passed muster because the classification of applicants
by race was merely a single part of a highly individualized
consideration. 153 The Court also noted that racial classifications utilized
in order to simply achieve racial balance would be "patently
unconstitutional." 154
The Court went on to explain that the Seattle school district's use
of race was like the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions
plan in Gratz v. Bollinger-it was utilized in a non-individualized,
mechanical manner that proves determinative. 155 Additionally, even just
Seattle School District No. 1,72 P.3d 151,166 (2003)(en banc».
148 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2749; Parents Involved, 377 F.3d 949 (2004); see generally
Katie York, What Does Diversity Mean in Seattle?: Parents Involved In Community Schools v.
Seattle School District Number I Strikes Down the Use of a Racial Tiebreaker, 35 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 51, 70-72 (2005).
149 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I,_U.S._, 127
S.Ct. 2738, 2749 (2007).
150 See Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2006 Supreme Court Term, 23
TOURO L. REv. 731, 732 (2008). Parents Involved was a 176-page long opinion, not counting
appendices. Dean Chemerinsky has commented that he believes the Court is writing longer opinions
than ever because they are taking fewer cases. As a result, Dean Chemerinsky has proposed that
word and page limits should be imposed on the Court's opinions. Id.
151 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I ,-U.S. - , 127
S.Ct. 2738, 2752-53 (2007) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003».
152 Parents Involved, 127 S.C\. at 2753 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325
(2003».
153 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2753 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337).
154 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2753 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
155 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2753-54 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275
(2003».
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from the race frame of reference, Seattle's plan merely categorized in
156
The Court took a color-blind
biracial terms: white or non-white.
approach to the Equal Protection Clause analysis, stating that this
approach is faithful to Brown v. Board of Education because "no State
has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities
among its citizens.,,157 As a result, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Grutter in upholding Seattle's race-based plan was
improper and therefore reversed and remanded the case. 158
b. Gonzales v. Carhart

In Gonzales v. Carhart (Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
Federation of America), the Supreme Court considered the validity of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Congress' first attempt at regulating
abortion. 159 The Act provides for civil and criminal penalties against
"[a]ny physician who ... knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion
and thereby kills a human fetus,,,I60 and the Act defines "partial-birth
abortion" as:
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately
and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, (I) in the case
of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of
the mother, or, (2) in the case of breech presentation, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the
partially delivered living fetus. 161

156 Parents Involved" 127 S.Ct. at 2754 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) ("We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent
communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals")
(O'Connor, J., dissenting».
157 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2767-68 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. in Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), p. 7 (Robert L. Carter, Dec. 9,1952».
158 Parents Involved, 127 S.C!. at 2768 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
159Gonzales v. Carhart, - U.S. -, 127, S.C!. 1610 (2007); 18 U.S.C.A § 1531 (Westlaw
2008). Although Gonzales v. Carhart was on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, Carhart was consolidated with Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., which was on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
160 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (2005) (Westlaw 2008).
161 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (b)(I)(A) (2005) (Westlaw 2008) .
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Planned Parenthood Golden Gate and the Planned Parenthood Federation
of America filed suit in the Northern District of California claiming the
law violated its Fifth Amendment due process rights. 162
Judge Phyllis Hamilton preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the
Act, and after a bench trial on the merits, Judge Hamilton issued a
seventy-five page opinion, holding the Act unconstitutional on three
grounds. 163 First, the court held that the Act poses an undue burden on a
woman's right to choose an abortion because the Act proscribes not only
intact dilation and extraction ("D & E") procedures, but other previability D & E procedures and possibly inductions, as well, in violation
of the Supreme Court's holding in Stenberg. l64 Second, the court held
that the Act was impermissibly vague. 165 Finally, Judge Hamilton held
that Congress failed to include a health exception in the Act, as required
under Stenberg. l66 Judge Hamilton then permanently enjoined the
Attorney General from enforcing the Act against the Plaintiffs. She
noted that "[ w]hile ... a nationwide injunction may be appropriate" in
this case, she deferred that decision to the other courts around the nation
also considering the issue. 167 On appeal in the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the three-judge panel consisting of Judges Reinhardt,
Thomas, and Fletcher affirmed the District Court's decision on all
counts. 168 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Stenberg to require a health
exception unless there exists a "consensus in the medical community that
the banned procedure is never medically necessary to preserve the health
of the women.,,169 Relying on Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
162 Similarly, the National Abortion Federation and Dr. Leroy Carhart, plaintiff in the
Stenberg case, and other physicians filed similar lawsuits challenging the Act in the United States
District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the District of Nebraska, respectively. See
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft. 330 F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Carhart v. Ashcroft,
331 F.Supp.2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004).
163 Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, 320 F.Supp.2d 957, 971 (N.D.
Cal. 2004). Judge Hamilton declined to reach the fourth issue, whether the Act violates a woman's
due process right to bodily integrity, because she found the Act unconstitutional on the other three
grounds.
164 /d. at 971. A 0 & E abortion is a surgical procedure, which is performed in two steps:
dilation of the cervix and surgical removal of the fetus. An intact 0 & E procedure is what is
politically referred to as a "partial-birth abortion." During an intact 0 & E, the fetus is removed
from the womb while fully intact. Then, through some overt act, the physician intentionally causes
fetal demise. An induction is another form of abortion, commonly referred to as a medical abortion,
where the woman is given medication to induce labor to expel the fetus.
165 [d. at,977.
166 [d. at 1033.
167 [d. at 1035 n.67.
168

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th CiT.

2006).
169 Gonzales
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New Eng., the Ninth Circuit determined that the Act was unconstitutional
on its face and therefore should be permanently enjoined. l7O
The Supreme Court held that the Act was not void for being
facially vague by prohibiting "intact" D & E procedures, and the Act
does not sweep too broadly to include typical D & E procedures.
Additionally, the Court held that the ban did not impose a substantial
obstacle on women seeking an abortion; the Act furthered legitimate
congressional purposes; and the absence of a health exception did not
render the Act facially unconstitutional.
The Court explained that the Act at issue in Carhart differed from
that in Stenberg because Congress supported the Act with its own factual
findings, whereas the Court in Stenberg was required to rely on the
district court's factual findings. l7I Additionally, the Court noted that the
language of the Act differs in important respects from that in Stenberg. 172
The Court also held that Stenberg's requirement that an abortion
regulation "contain a health exception if substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning a particular procedure could
endanger women's health ... was too exacting a standard to impose on
the legislative power.,,173 Finally, the Court added that the facial
challenge that was brought in these cases was not the proper vehicle for
challenging this Act; an as-applied challenge would be. 174 For all of
these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit. 175

c. Morse v. Frederick
On January 24, 2002, Joseph Frederick joined his classmates
across the street from Juneau-Douglas High School to watch the running
of the Olympic torch on its way to the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in
Salt Lake City, Utah. 176 When the television cameras neared, Frederick
and his friends exposed a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.,,177

Federation of America Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
170
Gonzales v. Carhart, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1625 (2007); Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
171
Gonzales v. Carhart, - U.S. -,127 S.Ct. 1610,1624 (2007).
172

[d..

173

[d. at 1638 (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,938 (2000)) (internal quotations

omitted).
174

Gonzales v. Carhart, - U.S. -,127 S.Ct. 1610, 1638-39 (2007).

175

[d. at 1639.

176 Frederick
177

v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006).

[d.
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Juneau-Douglas High School's principal, Deborah Morse, took and
destroyed the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days.17S
After administratively appealing his suspension without success,
Frederick filed sued under 42 U.s.C. § 1983 claiming that Morse and the
school board had violated his First Amendment rights. 179 The District
Court granted Morse and the school board's motion for summary
judgment for two reasons. First, the court found that Morse did not
violate Frederick's First Amendment rights. ISO Second, the court
concluded that Morse and the school board had qualified immunity from
civil liability in the alternative. lSI Frederick subsequently appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals began by classifying Frederick's speech as
"student speech" despite being off campus because Frederick was at a
school-authorized activity and some level of supervision existed. 182 As a
result, Frederick's speech was analyzed under a narrower range of cases.
The court restated its Chandler v. McMinnivlle School District test,
whereby student speech is analyzed according to three distinct
categories. 183 Under the first category, "vulgar, lewd, obscene, and
plainly offensive speech" is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. l84 However, the Ninth
Circuit refused to categorize Frederick's speech as "vulgar, lewd,
obscene, and plainly offensive speech" and distinguished Fraser in two
ways. First, the Court of Appeals contrasted the type of speech at issue
and found Frederick's banner was not similar to Matthew Fraser's
sexually explicit speech at a school assembly.185 More importantly, the
court determined that Frederick's speech did not disrupt a school
assembly; 186 therefore, no educational function was undermined. 187 As a

1d.
179/d. at 1116-17.
178

Frederick v. Morse, D.Alas. (May 27, 2003) at 4-5 (slip copy) (reasoning that Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 768 (1986) was controlling, as opposed to Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
181 Frederick v. Morse, D. Alas. (May 27, 2003) at 3 (slip copy).
182 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1117 (stating that "Frederick was a student, and school was in
session.").
183/d. at 1121 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.3d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1992».
184 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1121 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.3d
524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-85
(1986»).
185 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1119.
186 /d. at 1123.
187 /d. at 1120-23.
ISO
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result, Frederick's "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner should be reviewed
under another classification of student speech.
In the second Chandler classification, school-sponsored student
speech, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier is controlling. 188 The
Ninth Circuit again distinguished Frederick's speech from that in
Kuhlmeier because his banner was not "sponsored or endorsed by the
school, nor was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as part of
an official school activity.,,189 Excluding the first two Chandler
classifications, the court turned to the catch-all class of student speech.
In the final Chandler classification, student speech that does not
fall under the "vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive" or schoolsponsored speech is reviewed under the Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District decision. 19o The Ninth Circuit
interpreted Tinker to hold that "to censor or punish student speech, the
school must show a reasonable concern about the likelihood of
substantial disruption to its educational mission.,,191 Because Frederick's
speech could be viewed as political, 192 and because Morse and the school
board's concern was only to discourage drug use, the court found a
violation of Frederick's First Amendment rights. 193
In the second half of its decision, the Ninth Circuit dealt with
Morse's qualified immunity from money damages. Applying the threepart test from Saucier v. Katz, the Court of Appeals first concluded that
Morse had violated Frederick's First Amendment rights. 194 The court
also determined that Frederick's constitutional right was clearly
established when Morse destroyed the banner and punished him because
the prior decisions in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier and other cases clearly
established that right. 195 To satisfy the third prong of the Saucier test, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the undeniable law which Morse had exposure to
10 advanced school law courses to find "no reasonable government
188 ld. at 1121 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.3d 524,529 (9th Cir.
1992) (applying Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))).
189 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1119-20.
190 ld. at 1121 (citing Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.3d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1992) (applying Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 51314 (1969)).
191 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123.
192 Frederick's speech was arguably political by virtue of advocating a position contrary to
government policy because Alaska had recurring "referenda regarding marijuana legalization"
Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1119, and because the Alaska Supreme Court had decided a controversial
case upholding the private possession of marijuana in an individual's home for personal use Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
193 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123.
194 1d. at,1123 (applying Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001)).
195 Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1124.
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official could have believed the censorship and punishment of
Frederick's speech was lawful."l96 As a result, Morse was not entitled to
qualified immunity from money damages.
Morse and the school board would not be without vindication.
The Supreme Court ultimately found that Morse and the school board
had not violated Frederick's First Amendment right. 197 In so deciding,
the Court began by agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's decision that
Frederick's banner was speech, and specifically student speech. 198 The
Court then set out to analyze the facts of this case in the context of
Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier. The Court made short work of the
Kuhlmeier precedent in a similar way to the Ninth Circuit, stating that it
did "not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that
Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur."I99 The Court also
rejected the classifications of Tinker and Fraser because the present case
was "plainly not. ... about political debate over the criminalization of
drug use or possession" and Frederick's speech was not within the
"definition of 'offensive. ",200
Instead of resolving the Tinker! Fraser debate, the Court borrowed
from a hodgepodge of other cases to apply a wholly new test to
Frederick's speech.
Taking from Tinker and Fraser, the Court
rationalized that there were "special characteristics of the school
environment,,201 enough so that "the constitutional rights of students ...
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.,,202 The Court next borrowed from Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton to find an "important - - indeed, perhaps compelling-"
interest in stopping drug abuse in school children. 203 Within this
framework, the Court declared that schools can restrict student speech, so
long as they "reasonably regard [it] as promoting illegal drug use.,,204
Because Morse's reasonable interpretation of "BONG HiTS FOR
JESUS" was that it promoted illegal drug abuse, Frederick's First
Amendment right had not been violated. 205

1d.
197 Morse v. Frederick. _
198 1d. at 2624-25.
196

199

Id. at 2627.

200

Id. at 2625. 2629.

U.S. _ . 127 S.Ct. 2618. 2622 (2007).

1d. at 2629 (quoting Tinker. 393 U.S. at 506).
202 Morse. 127 S.C!. at 2626 (quoting Fraser. 478 U.S. at 682).
203 Morse. 127 S.C!. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia School Dis!. 47J v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646. 661
(1995».
204 Morse. 127 S.C!. at 2629.
20S Id. at 2624.
201
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d. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettelle

Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele. Los Angeles County
Sheriffs had been investigating four Mrican-American suspects on
suspicion of fraud and identity-theft for several months. 206 On December
11, 2001, Deputy Dennis Watters obtained a search warrant for the
suspect's home in Lancaster, California. 207 Unknown to the officers, the
suspects had sold the home to Max Rettele several months earlier, a
Caucasian male. 2os On December 19, 2001, Deputy Watters and six
other Los Angeles County deputies executed their warrant. 209 After
confronting seventeen-year-old Chase Hall, another Caucasian male, at
the doorway, the officers continued their search of the home. 210
Eventually entering Rettele's bedroom, the officers ordered a naked
Rettele and girlfriend out of bed at gunpoint. 211 All occupants of the
home were Caucasian.
Rettele brought an action for a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights, arguing that the officers had conducted an unlawful
and unreasonable search and detention. 212 The United States District
Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment
because it found the offers were entitled to qualified immunity.213 On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court applied the two-step analysis for
law enforcement qualified immunity.214 First, the Ninth Circuit set out to
determine "whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right.,,215 Based on several facts in the case, the court concluded that "a
reasonable jury could conclude that the search and detention were
'unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged,' and involved 'an undue
invasion of privacy. ",216 Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the officers violated Rettele's Fourth Amendment rights.217

Los Angeles County, California v. RetteIe, 550 U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. 1989, 1990 (2007).
Id. at 1990-91.
208 Id. at 1991.
209 Id.

206

207

210
211
212

Id. at 1991.
Id. at 1991.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2008); Los Angeles County v.
Rette1e, 186 Fed. Appx. 765, 765-66 (9th Cir., 2006); see generally John R. Kennel & Jane E.
Lehman, Searches and Seizures, 68 Am. Jur. 2d, § 10 et seq., (2008).
213 Rettele v. Los Angeles County, 186 Fed. Appx. 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2006).
214 Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194,201 (2001)).
215 Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 186 Fed. Appx. 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2006).
216 1d. at 767 (citing Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)). Among the
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Having found that the officers did violate a constitutional right,
the Ninth Circuit applied the second step in the analysis: was the
constitutional right clearly established when the violation occurred?
According to the court, a reasonable officer would have known Rettele's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated as soon as they saw three
Caucasian individuals who posed no safety threat. 218 Because both
elements of the Moreno/Saucier test were satisfied, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the summary judgment order and remanded the case.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
found that the officers did qualify for immunity.z19 The Court focused on
two aspects of the search in making its decision. First, the Court
determined that there was a safety risk to the officers because Rettele
could have been concealing a weapon in the bed and the AfricanAmerican suspects could have been in the home. 220 Second, the Court
determined that the length and circumstances surrounding the search
were not enough to render it unreasonable.221 Because the Court
determined there was no violation of Rettele's Fourth Amendment rights,
it avoided applying the second part of the Moreno/Saucier test. 222

2.

Individual and Civil Liberties and the Courts' Decisions

The First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments have strong ties to
individual rights and civil liberties, and the Supreme Court's decisions in
these areas tend to disavow individual rights and civil liberties that the
Ninth Circuit had previously determined existed. Carhart chipped away
at the choices women have in seeking an abortion. Morse, while an
arguably limited holding, chipped away at students' free speech rights.
facts cited which were sufficient to find a constitutional violation, the court lists that no AfricanAmericans lived in the home, Rettele purchased the home several months before the warrant was
issued, no suspected crimes warranted an emergency search, and Rettele and his girlfriend were
ordered out of bed at gunpoint. [d.
217 Los Angeles County v. Renele, 186 Fed. Appx. 765, 767 (9th CiT. 2006).
218/d. at 766.
Los Angeles County v. Renele, 550 U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. 1989, 1993-94 (2007).
at 1993 (citing several cases where police officers found guns concealed in blankets
and bedding: U.S. v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788 (2003); U.S. v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245 (2003); U.S. v.
Hightower, 96 F.3d 211 (1996); State v. Willis, 843 So.2d 592 (2003); State v. Kypreos, 115 Wash.
App. 207 (2002)).
221 Rette/e, 127 S.Ct. at 1993 (following the rule in Michigan v. Summers, 452, U.S. 692, 705
n.21 (1981), the Court focused on the search lasting only fifteen minutes, Rettele and his girlfriend
being naked for less than two minutes, and the officers rapid response after they determined no
immediate threat existed).
222 Rette/e, 127 S.Ct. at 1993-94.
219

220/d.
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Rettele chipped away at the right to be free from umeasonable searches
while in the sanctity of one's home. Finally, Parents Involved is a more
complicated case, but it also chipped away at the inroads of the civil
rights movement by instituting a colorblind theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment into education. 223
The Constitution of the United States was drafted to create a
federal government, balance federal and state power, and protect
individual rights. 224 Federalism refers to balancing power between state
and federal governments, and the drafters intended to protect individual
rights by restraining and balancing these governmental powers.225 The
Supreme Court however has taken a more active role in establishing
individual rights, and the limits thereof, in its recent history by
centralizing a national view and interpretation of these rights. 226 This is
surprising because, at the same time, the Court has been decentralizing
government power and distributing the power back to the states. 227
The road leading to Carhart illustrates the Court's centralization
of individual liberties. First, Roe v. Wade held that a woman has a right
to choose whether to have an abortion so long 'as that decision is made
during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.z28 Second, the Court
determined that the government had an interest in protecting fetal and
life therefore could place reasonable restrictions on a woman's ability to
obtain an abortion so long as the restrictions did not pose an undue
burden in Casey v. Planned Parenthood. 229 Next, the Court struck down
partial-birth abortion bans in effect in thirty states in Stenberg v.
223 See Julie M. Cheslik, Andrea McMurtry, and Kristin Underwood, Supreme Court Report
2006-2007: Closing the Courthouse Doors?, 39 URB. LAW. 739, 777 (2007) (noting majority's
"color-blind reading of Brown [v. Board of Education]" and comparing with dissent's opinion that
such a reading undermines Brown's promise of integrated ... education") (internal quotations
omitted).
224 Patrick M. Garry, Liberty From On High: The Growing Reliance on a Centralized
Judiciary to Protect Individual Liberty, 95 Ky. L.J. 385, 389 (2006) ("The Constitution's
embodiment of the structural principles of federalism is designed not just to create a workable
government but to create one that protects individual rights. . .. Alexander Hamilton argued that
individuals who felt their rights were violated by the central government could use the state
governments as the instrument of redress.").
225 Patrick M. Garry, Liberty From On High: The Growing Reliance on a Centralized
Judiciary to Protect Individual Liberty, 95 Ky. L.J. 385, 389-90 (2006). Of course, there was a
contingent that insisted on adding the Bill of Rights, which specifically enumerates a number of
individual liberties, but even the Bill of Rights ends with two amendments-the Ninth and Tenthwhich reserve non-delegated powers to the states and limits the enumerated federal powers because
individual rights could not be left merely to specific enumeration.
226 Id. at 387 (citing Robert F. Nagel, The Implosion of American Federalism, 12 (2001)).
m See id. at 387.
228 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
229 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Carhart. 230 And most recently, as discussed above, the Court sanctioned
a federal partial-birth abortion ban in Gonzales v. Carhart. 231 This
decision, which explicitly sanctioned Congress' fIrst attempt at
regulating abortion, represents the culmination of regulating individual
liberties from a centralized-federal perspective.
Unsurprisingly, this framework fits nicely into the Supreme
Court's and the Ninth Circuit's analyses of habeas petitions described
above. 232 The Ninth Circuit's review of federal habeas petitions from
state prisoners indicates a move away from supporting federal power in
this area.233 The Supreme Court's review of these same cases, however,
indicates that the Court is moving towards a decentralized view of
federalism.
As noted above, the Court has been progressively
decentralizing government power.

C.

IMMIGRATION CASES

Compared to the other circuits, immigration cases comprise a
large part of the Ninth Circuit's docket every year. 234 Unlike habeas law,
which can involve intertwined issues of state and federal law,
immigration is regulated solely by federal law.235 In fact, the federal
immigration laws expressly preempt any state action within the field of
immigration. 236 As a result, the courts-both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court-are dealing solely with the scope of federal power in
these cases.237
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S._, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).
232 See section I(A), supra.
233 See section I(A)(2), supra.
234 Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here: Managing Judicial Review of
Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 423 (2007) ("Chief Judge Mary Schroeder of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reported that more than 40 percent of her circuit's docket was
immigration-related."); see also James C. Duff, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2007
Annual Report of the Director, Table B-3 (Washington D.C., U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2007)
(reporting the number of appeals to the Ninth Circuit from the Board of Immigration Appeals for the
years
2003
through
2007),
available
at
http://www .u scourts.gov/judbu s2007 /J udicialB usi nespdfversi on. pdf.
235 Adam L. Lounsbury, A Nationalist Critique of Local Lows Purporting to Regulate the
Hiring of Undocumented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 415, 427 (2008) ("the history of the power to
regulate immigration has evolved to become an exclusive province of the federal government").
236 /d. at 429 ("it would appear that by operation of the preemption doctrine [that] states are
powerless to regulate immigration").
237 Id. at 427 ("The delicate balance of power between the federal government and the several
states has been a timeless and dynamic struggle.... The question whether the power to regulate
immigration ... rests exclusively with the federal government or with the several states is not
230
231
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Summary of Cases

a. Gonzales v. Duena-Alvarez
In Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, Luis Duenas-Alvarez, a permanent
resident alien of the United States, was convicted of violating California
Vehicle Code § 10851(a), which prohibits the theft, or the aiding and
abetting of the theft, of an automobile. 238 A federal immigration judge
found that Duenas-Alvarez's conviction, aiding and abetting the theft of
an automobile, subjected him to removal from the United States because
his offense was "a theft offense ... for which the term of imprisonment
[is] at least one year.,,239 The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed
this decision, and Duenas-Alvarez appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 240
While Duenas-Alvarez's petition for review was pending in the
Ninth Circuit, the court held in Penuliar v. Ashcroft that the relevant
California Vehicle Code provision, section l0851(a), sweeps more
broadly than generic theft. 241 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the Ninth Circuit's holding in Penuliar that aiding and abetting
a theft is not a crime that falls within the generic definition of theft. 242
The Supreme Court overturned Penuliar in holding that, because there
exists no distinction between principals and aiders and abetters in the
commission of a felony and because the California Vehicle Code section
at issue does not apply to conduct that falls outside the generic definition
of theft, the crime of aiding and abetting a theft offense could subject the
offender to removal proceedings. 243
b. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce
In United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, the Supreme Court relaxed
pleading requirements in federal immigration cases. Resendiz-Ponce
was convicted of attempted reentry into the United States after having

explicitly constitutionally committed.").
237 Gonzales v. Duenas·Alvarez, 549 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 815 (2007).
238 1d. at 819.
at 819; 8 U.S.CA. § I 10 I (a)(43)(G) (Westlaw 2008).
240 Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 819.
241 /d. at 819 (citing Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037 (9th CiT. 2005)).
242
Id.
243
1d.
239/d.
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been previously deported twice, once in 1988 and again in 2002.244
When Resendiz-Ponce attempted reentry, he walked up to a port of entry,
displayed a photo identification of his cousin to the border agent, told the
agent that he was a legal resident, and stated that he was traveling to
Calexico, California. 245 Resendiz-Ponce was charged with violating 8
U.S.c. § 1326(a), which proscribes any subsequent attempt at reentry
after deportation. 246 The indictment alleged that on June 1, 2003,
Resendiz-Ponce "knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter the
United States of America at or near San Luis ... , after having been
previously ... deported, and removed from the United States.,,247 The
Ninth Circuit set aside the conviction and remanded for dismissal of the
indictment because the indictment failed to allege a specific overt act that
Resendiz-Ponce committed in seeking reentry.248 Instead, the indictment
merely alleged a generalized attempt to enter the country, which in the
view of the Ninth Circuit failed to alert Resendiz-Ponce to the specific
overt act that would be proved at tria1. 249 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and requested supplemental briefing after oral argument on the
question of whether the indictment was in fact defective. 25o
The Supreme Court reasoned that the generalized "attempt"
language in the indictment encompassed both the overt act and intent
elements and that an allegation detailing respondent's presentation of a
false identification, or other specific act, was unnecessary.251
Additionally, the Court noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were intended to eliminate the complicated technicalities of
common law pleading requirements. 252 For these reasons, the Court
reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. 253

2.

Immigration Law and the Courts' Decisions

While the Supreme Court reviewed only two immigration law
cases from the Ninth Circuit, the two cases demonstrate different

244

u.s. v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 782, 785-86 (2007).

245

[d. at 786.

246

[d. at 786.

247

[d. at 786.

248

[d. at 785.

249
250

251

Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S.Ct. at 787.
[d. at 785-86.
!d. at 787-88.

252 [d.
153

at 782, 789.

[d. at 790.
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approaches taken by the two courts. In both cases the Ninth Circuit took
a view which strictly interpreted the federal immigration laws, and in
both cases, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme
Court took a view that broadly interpreted the federal immigration laws,
essentially broadening federal power in this area. In Resendiz-Ponce the
Court held that non-particularized pleadings were sufficient, and in
Duenas-Alvarez the Court held that a permanent resident alien who
violates California's code provision prohibiting aiding and abetting
automobile theft would be subject to removal proceedings.

D.

FURTHER CASES

The following section outlines and summarizes the remammg
cases decided during the Supreme Court's October 2006 term on
certiorari from the Ninth Circuit. These cases include decisions
regarding ERISA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Communications
Act, federal environmental regulations, and the Bankruptcy Code, among
others.

1.

Summary of Cases

a. Beck v. PACE International Union

Beck v. PACE Intern. Union involved a disagreement between the
two courts over interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA,,).254 Crown Vantage, Inc. and its subsidiary,
Crown Paper Co. (consolidated here as "Crown") were spin-off
corporations from the James River Corporation. 255 Crown produced
paper products in seven paper mills and employed 2,600 employees,
including Edward Miller and Jeffrey Macek, who were covered by
PACE International Union's ("PACE") collective bargaining
agreement. 256 Crown had eighteen defined-benefit pension plans for its
employees, for which the board of directors served as trustees. 257
254 Beck v. Pace Intern. Union, 427 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd, Beck v. Pace Intern.
Union, 551 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 2310 (2007).
255 See In re Crown Vantage, Inc. 421 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2005).
256 See Beck, 427 F.3d at 668.
257 See Beck v. Pace Intern. Union, 551 U.S. _
, 127 S.Ct. 2310, 2314 (2007) (clarifying
that a "defined-benefit pension plan" is a retirement plan entitling participants to a fixed periodic
payment, whereby the employer shoulders the investment risk, i.e., making up for any deficits in the
plan, but also benefits if the plan exceeds expectations).
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In March 2000, Crown filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. 258
Over a year later, Crown's board of directors began investigating the
purchase of an annuity as a means to a "standard termination" of the
pension plans?59 At the same time, PACE proposed an alternative to the
annuity, whereby the assets of the seventeen pension plans covering
PACE members would be merged into the PACE Industrial Union
Management Pension Fund ("PIUMPF,,).260
Under ERISA, Crown was subject to certain procedural and
methodological requirements when terminating its pension plans. 261 The
longstanding practice of pension plan standard terminations was to
purchase annuities through lump-sum payments. 262 Crown ultimately
decided to terminate twelve pension plans by purchasing an annuity from
Under that
Hartford Life Insurance Company ("Hartford"). 263
arrangement, Crown paid Hartford $84 million, but was given a
projected reversion of nearly $5 million; equal to the amount Crown had
overfunded certain plans. 264 A central issue in this case was therefore
Crown's method when terminating the plans and making a final
distribution of assets. 265
Miller, Macek, and PACE sued in bankruptcy court arguing that
the PIUMPF merger proposal was a legal alternative method to the
Hartford annuity, and when Crown failed to adequately consider the
merger, Crown breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA.
The
bankruptcy court agreed with PACE and issued a preliminary injunction
that required Crown to place all cash assets still in the pension plan into
an interest-bearing account, prohibited the reversion of assets to Crown,
and ordered Crown and PACE to 'report on the feasibility of distribution
the reversion 'for the benefit ofthe pension plan participants;'" however,
the Hartford annuity transaction was not voided. 266 Based on the joint
reports submitted by Crown and PACE, the bankruptcy court approved

258

Crown Vantage, 421 F.3d at 967.
See Beck, 427 F.3d at 672·73 (an annuity is generally a contract giving the holder a right to
receive periodic fixed payment over a period of time).
260 Id. at 672.
261 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Westlaw 2008).
262 See Beck, 551 U.S. _
, 127 S.Ct. at 2318.
263 Beck, 427 F.3d at 672·73.
264 Id. at 672.73.
265 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341(b)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2008).
266 Beck, 427 F.3d at 673.
259

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4

442

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

the distribution of assets to the plan participants, but it left the injunction
regarding the remaining pension plan assets in effect. 267
Crown appealed to the District Court of Northern District of
California arguing three points: (1) Miller, Macek, and PACE lacked
standing, (2) Crown was not subject to a fiduciary obligation, and (3)
similarly, Crown did not breach any duty because the proposed merger
was an impermissible method of terminating the pension plans. 268 The
District Court found that Miller and Macek had standing, while PACE
did not because it was not a pension plan participant, beneficiary,
fiduciary, employer, or state pursuant to ERISA's requirements. 269
PACE's standing was also rejected because PACE failed to allege a
violation of ERISA § 4041 in its complaint. 270 The District Court
disagreed with Crown's second and third arguments, affirming the
bankruptcy court's preliminary injunction and found a breached fiduciary
duty. 271
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Crown again argued that ERISA and
the pension plans prohibited a merger into the PIUMPF; thus, not
adequately considering the proposal was not a breach of a fiduciary duty.
PACE also cross-appealed, arguing that it had standing to challenge the
termination. 272 The Ninth Circuit first rejected Crown's argument that
the pension plans themselves prohibit a merger into the PIUMPF because
Crown never raised the issue before the bankruptcy court. 273 The court
then drew a distinction between deciding to terminate a pension plan and
implementing a decision to terminate, where the former is not fiduciary
in nature but the latter is?74 The court found that the merger was within
the implementation of a plan termination because the merger itself was a
permissible method, stating that "neither [ERISA] nor its implementing
regulations preclude mergers into multiemployer plans as a method of
providing such benefit liabilities.,,275 Therefore Crown owed a fiduciary
duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries under ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit thus agreed with both the District Court and
bankruptcy court and found that Crown "failed to make the requisite

267

268

[d. at 673.
[d.

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West1aw 2008).
29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Westiaw 2008).
271 Beck, 427 F.3d at 673.
272 [d. at 673-74.
273 [d. at 674.
274 [d. at 673.
275 [d. at 676.
2ffJ

270
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'intensive and scrupulous' investigation of investment options.,,276 This
and other events had the effect of prioritizing another interest-buying
the Hartford annuity-above those of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries. As a result, Crown breached its fiduciary obligation under
ERISA's "exclusive benefit" rule. 277
The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated the District Court's ruling that
PACE lacked standing. 278 The court reasoned that even though the case
could proceed without PACE, because PACE "has institutional resources
and experience ... it may be in a better position to protect the rights of
all of its members," the case should be remanded to the bankruptcy court
for PACE to amend its complaint and allege violations of ERISA and
new theories of standing. 279 Crown subsequently appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The Court did agree with the Ninth Circuit and determined that the
permissibility of the merger under the pension plans themselves was not
at issue. 28o The Court next turned to the permissibility of the merger
under ERISA. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"), which filed an amicus curiae brief, had
concluded that because a merger was an alternative and not an example
of a plan termination method, the merger was not permissible. 281 It
would then follow that Crown had not breached its fiduciary duties.
The Court has a history of deferring to the PBGC when
interpreting ERISA because "to attempt to answer [ERISA] questions
without the views of the [PBGC] ... would be to embar[k] upon a
voyage without a compass.,,282 As a result, the Court's analysis centered
on PBGC's statutory interpretation. The Court ultimately agreed with
the PBGC rather than the Ninth Circuit and PACE, holding "that merger
is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer definedbenefit pension plan.,,283 The Court concluded that a "merger is not like
the purchase of [an] annuity" for three reasons. 284 First, while the
purchase of an annuity would "formally sever[] the applicability of

276 [d. at 677 (applying the standard set forth in Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 125-26 (7th
Cir. 1984».
277 29 U.S.CA. § II 04(a) (I )(A) (Westlaw 2008).
278 Beck, 427 F.3d at 680.
279 [d. at 679-80.
280 Beck, 55 I U.S. _
, 127 S.Ct. at 2317 n.3.
281 [d. at 2317 (referencing PBGC's amicus curiae brief) PBGC was created by ERISA to
insure the defined benefit pension plans covered under ERISA by levying insurance premiums.
282 [d. (quoting Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714,726 (1989».
283 [d. at 2321
284 [d. at 2318
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285
ERISA," a merger would not.
Second, the Hartford annuity method
allowed for Crown to obtain a $5 million reversion, whereas the
PIUMPF merger would not. 286 Third, mergers were distinguished from
terminations because mergers were not mentioned in ERISA § 1341,287
mergers had their own sections within ERISA,288 and mergers and
terminations had separate rules and procedures.
Because the merger was an alternative rather than an example of a
permissible plan termination, thus making it an impermissible form of
termination under ERISA, no fiduciary obligation under ERISA existed
for Crown to violate. 289 The Court did not reach the issue of PACE's
standing, and having disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's statutory
interpretation, reversed on the issue of the merger's permissibility under
ERISA.

b. Safeco Insurance Company of America v, Burr
Unlike Beck, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
statutory interpretation, in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr. 29o In
Safeco, the Supreme Court was called upon to settle a split in the Circuit
Courts by determining if the Fair Credit Report Act's willful failure
standard extended to acts of reckless disregard, and also to clarify the
Act's notice requirements.z91
To guard against unfair and inaccurate credit reporting, Congress
enacted the Fair Credit Report Act in 1970.292 Under this Act, those who
seek to adversely affect an individual based on their credit report must

285/d.
286 Beck, 551 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. at 2319 The Court reached its conclusion for two reasons.
First, because the PIUMPF merger was only the anticipation of a future termination rather than a
valid termination, a reversion was impermissible under 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(I)-(3). Secondly, the
reversion under the PIUMPF merger would violate the anti-inurement provision found in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c).
287 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (Westlaw 2008).
288 See e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1058,1411,1412 (Westlaw 2008).
289 Beck, 551 U.S. _
, 127 S.Ct. at 2320 (2007).
290 Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd
on other grounds, 551 U.S. _ , 127 S.C!. 2201 (2007).
291 Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 _ , 127 S.Ct. 220 I, 2208 (2007). The Third
Circuit adopted a reckless disregard standard. Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 227
(3rd Cir. 1997). The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, by contrast, required
knowledge and intentional violations. Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409,418
(4th Cir. 2001); Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2001); Duncan v.
Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 1998); Wantz v. Experian Information Solutions, 386 F.3d
829,834 (7th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 368 (8th Cir. 2002).
292 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681-1681x (Westloaw 2008).
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notify them beforehand. 293 In the context of insurance companies,
"adverse action" includes denying, canceling, increasing, or reducing the
terms or insurance amount of existing or future policies. 294 To give the
FCRA teeth, Congress allowed for a private cause of action if a business
uses credit reports to adversely affect an individual but fails to comply
with the Act, including failure to give required notice.295 If the insurance
company acts willfully, the affected individual can collect actual
damages, punitive damages, and/or statutory damages. 296
If the
insurance company acts negligently, affected individuals can collect
actual damages, costs of litigation, and reasonable attorney fees. 297
The case before the Supreme Court was the consolidation of two
Ninth Circuit cases. In Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Services Group,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit itself consolidated two additional appeals:
Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Service, Inc. and Edo v. GEICO Casualty
CO. 298 In Reynolds, Jason Jay Reynolds received a home and auto
insurance policy from various subsidiaries of Hartford Financial Services
Group, Inc (consolidated here as "Hartford,,).299 In issuing home and
auto insurance policies, employees of Hartford consulted one of the
"consumer information bureaus" to determine an applicant's credit
report. 300 Under Hartford's practice, credit scores were used to
determine an insurance rate, for which there was a direct correlation to
an applicant's insurance rate. 301 However, to be assigned to the top
insurance tier and receive a lower rate, an applicant's insurance score
must have been based on an actual credit report score as opposed to a "no
score.,,302 Reynolds' policy was based only on his insurance score and
not on a credit score; thus, he did not qualify for a reduced rate. 303
IS U.S.C.A. § 168Im(a) (Westlaw 2008) (requiring the notice to include the specific
adverse action, detail how to contact the acting party, and also give information on how to gain a
free copy of the report and dispute the adverse action).
294 IS U.S.C.A. § 168Ia(k)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2008).
295 IS U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n, 16810 (Westlaw 2008).
2% IS U.S.C.A. § 1681n (Westlaw 2008).
297 IS U.S.C.A. § 16810 (Westlaw 2008).
298 Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th CiT. 2006),
rev'd on other grounds, 551 U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. 220 I (2007).
299 Id. at 1086-88.
300 "Consumer information bureaus" are more commonly known as credit reporting agencies;
Id. at 1087. Hartford Fire consulted Trans Union; however, the other common credit reporting
agencies include Equifax and Experian. Id.
293

1d..
302 ld .
301

303 1d. at 1087 n.5 Reynolds' homeowner's insurance credit score request returned a "no
score" result because insufficient information existed, and his auto insurance credit score request
returned a "no hit" result because his personal information did not match the national database. Id.
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Nevertheless, Hartford did not give Reynolds notice of the adverse
action. 304
Similar to Reynolds, Ajene Edo applied for an auto insurance
policy from subsidiaries of the GEICO Corporation (consolidated here as
"GEICO,,).305 GEICO's practice was similar to Hartford's, with one
additional step.306 GEICO compared an applicant's actual insurance
score and an artificial insurance score derived from a "neutral" credit
report. 30? If an applicant's artificial and actual insurance scores were
equal, no notice of adverse action was sent; however, if an applicant's
artificial score would have qualified her for a lower insurance rate, a
notice of action was sent. 308 Because there was no difference between
Edo's artificial and actual scores, he was not issued an adverse action
notice. 309 The situation was very similar in Safeco. 310 In all three of the
consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought damages under the FCRA on behalf
of a class.311 And in all three cases the insurance companies were
granted summary judgment by the district courts. 312
The Ninth Circuit first tackled the consolidated appeal of Reynolds
and Edo. In rejecting the argument that only the insurance policy issuing
company can be liable under the FCRA, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
summary judgment order and articulated several definitions and
standards. 313
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the initial issuance of an
insurance policy is tantamount to an "increase" under FCRA if the
company "charges ... a higher initial rate than it would otherwise have
charged.,,314 Second, the court concluded that an "adverse action" under
the FCRA occurs whenever an individual "would have received a lower
rate for his insurance had the information in his consumer report been
304

Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1087.

305

[d. at 1088.

306
307

[d. at 1089.
[d.

308

[d. at 1089-90.

309

[d. at 1090.

310 Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. 220 I, 2207 (2007). Insurance
applicants, Charles Burr and Shannon Massey, were given lower insurance rates based on their credit
report scores without being issued an adverse action report. [d.
311 Rausch v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., D. Or., 2003 (July 31,2003); Reynolds
v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 416 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2005); Spano v. SAFECO Ins.
Co. of America, 215 F.R.D. 601 (D. Or. 2003).
312 Rausch v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., D.Or., 2003 (July 31,2003); Reynolds
v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 416 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2005); Spano v. SAFECO Ins.
Co. of America, 215 F.R.D. 601 (D.Or. 2003).
313 Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1096.
314 !d. at 1092.
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more favorable.,,315 Third, it held that the definition of a "consumer
report" under FCRA was extended to include "communication that a
consumer has no information available or an insufficient credit history to
permit the calculation of a credit rating.,,316 Next, the Ninth Circuit
stated that minimum "notice" under the FCRA "must communicate to the
consumer that an adverse action based on a consumer report was taken,
describe the action, specify the effect of the action upon the consumer,
and identify the party or parties taking the action.,,317 Finally, the court
concluded that an act is "willful" under the FCRA if "a company . . .
performs an act ... in reckless disregard of [a consumer's rights under
15 U.S.C. § 1681n].,,318 In light of its decision in Reynolds, the Ninth
Circuit merely issued a memorandum decision reversing the district
court's summary judgment order in Safeco. 319
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court ultimately agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's definition and standards. After considering the
distinction between criminal and civil willfulness and looking at the
drafting history of the FRCA, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit
that "willful" in the FRCA could be read to include reckless disregard. 320
The Court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that initial
issuances of insurance policies constitute "increases" under the FRCA. 321
The Court went further in articulating the test for determining the
baseline when determining if an "adverse action" occurred and an initial
rate disadvantages an individual under the FCRA. According to the
Court, the difference between the rate an individual receives and the rate
they would have received had no credit information been used (Le., a
"neutral" score) should be considered III determining their
disadvantage. 322
Despite agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of FRCA,
the Court disagreed with its application thereof. According to the Court,
GEICO's action was permissible because the initial rate received was no
different then a rate based on no credit reports; thus GEICO had no duty
to notify Edo and escaped liability.323 The Court also freed Safeco of any

315

[d. at 1093.
at 1094.

316/d.
317

318

[d. at 1094-95.
[d. at 1099.

Spano v. Safe co Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746 (9th Cir. 2005).
320 Safeco, 551 _ , 127 S.O. at 2208-09.
321 [d. at 2211-12.
322 [d. at 2213-14. Contrast the Court's theory with comparing the initial rate received and the
rate that would have been received using the highest possible creditworthiness available.
323 [d. at 2214.
319
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liability to Burr and Massey because Safeco's "reading of the [FCRA],
albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable" and therefore not
reckless. 324

c. Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophone
Telecommunications, Inc.
As with Safeco, the Supreme Court affIrmed the Ninth Circuit's
statutory and regulatory interpretation in Global Crossing
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc, only
this time the Court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit's application of its
Metrophones Telecommunications Services, Inc.
interpretations. 325
("Metrophones") owned and operated public payphones as a "payphone
service provider.,,326 Before 1996, payphone service providers like
Metrophones were uncompensated for and unable to block "dial-around"
calls, such as "1-800" numbers, accessed on their phones but placed
through long distance carriers. 327 In the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which amended the Communications Act of 1934, Congress
allowed the Federal Commutations Commission ("FCC") to enact
regulations for compensation to payphone service providers from long
distance service carries. 328 Congress also created a mechanism for
enforcement, stating that "[a]ny person claiming to be damaged by any
common carrier . . . may bring suit for recovery of the damages for
which such common carrier may be liable under the provision of [Title
47, Chapter 5], in any district court of the United States.,,329 However,
this power was limited to instances when the statue "prohibited" the
conduct, or when the FCC "declared [the conduct] to be unlawful.,,330
In April 2003, Metrophones sued four long distance phone service
carries (consolidated here as "Global Crossing") for not compensating
Metrophones for "dial-around" calls made using Metrophones' public
payphones. 331 Metrophones initially brought its suits alleging a violation

324

[d. at 2215.

325 Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 423
F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2005), ajf'd, 550 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 1513 (2007).
326 !d. at 1062.
327

[d.

328 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); see also,
e.g .. , 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300 (Westlaw 2008); see also Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v.
Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1062 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)
329 47 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Westlaw 2008).
330 47 U.S.c.A. § 206 (Westlaw 2008).
331 Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 423
F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant carriers initially included Global Crossing
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of 47 U.S.c. § 276 and a state law claim for quantum meruit. 332 Three
months after Metrophones filed its action, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
there was no private right to recover compensation under 47 U.S.c. §
276. 333 Global Crossing thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 334 The District Court denied Global Crossing's motion and
allowed Metrophones to amend its complaint to include two additional
federal claims and two additional state law claims. 335
On an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Metrophones
asserted five grounds to recover compensation: (1) 47 U.S.C. § 201(b),
(2) 47 U.S.C. § 416(c), (3) quantum meruit, (4) breach of implied
contract, and (5) negligence. Dealing with the first claim, the FCC had
interpreted 47 U.S.c. § 201(b) to find that a "failure to pay in accordance
with the [FCC], s rules ... constitutes ... an unjust and unreasonable
practice" which is therefore actionable in federal district court under 47
U.S.c. §§ 206 and 207. 336 Because of the dichotomy between the FCC's
interpretation, the Communications Act, and the Ninth Circuit's earlier
case, the court applied the Chevron deference test. 337 After finding that
the Communication Act was ambiguous as to Congress' intent, 338 and
concluding that the FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.c. § 201(b) was a
"fair and considered judgment" which was a "reasonable" interpretation,
the Ninth Circuit deferred to the FCC's interpretation and affirmed the
grant ofleave to Metrophones to amend and include 47 U.S.c. § 201(b)
in its complaint. 339
The Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion regarding
Metrophones' 47 U.S.C. § 416(c) claim, and refused to defer to the
FCC's interpretation because "it would make every pronouncement of
the Commission automatically enforceable in a private action, contrary to
the intent of Congress.,,340 As a result, the court reversed the district
Telecommunications, Inc., Southwestern Bell Communication Services, Inc.,
Communications, Inc., and Vartec Telecom, Inc.).
332 [d. at 1062-63.
333 Greene v. Sprint Communications Co., 340 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2003).
334 Metrophones, 423 F.3d at 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2005).

Wiltel

335

[d.

336

[d. at 1064 (quoting from the FCC's 2003 Payphone Order) (emphasis added).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44

337

(1984).
338 Metrophones, 423 F.3d at 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining the statute was ambiguous
because the FCC had been given broad regulatory powers under §20 I, the statute did not clearly
limit a definition of "practice" to something other than what the FCC had interpreted, and Congress
had not "expressed a clear intent to make private actions to recover payphone compensation
unavailable under any provision of the Act").
339 [d. at 1070.
340 [d. at 1071.
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court's order giving Metrophones leave to amend and include 47 V.S.c.
§ 416(c) in its complaint.
Finally dealing with Metrophones' state law claims, the Ninth
Circuit wrestled with the issue of federal preemption because the Act
stated: "To the extent that any State requirements are inconsistent with
the Commission's regulations, the Commission's regulations on such
matters shall preempt such State requirements.,,341 Because "state
contract law, not the federal regulations, would govern the resolution of
contract-related questions," Metrophones' breach of implied contract
claim was not barred by federal preemption. 342 Similarly, Metrophones'
quantum meruit claim was not barred by federal preemption because the
measure of Metrophones' compensation under this theory would be
equal to that under the federal regulations. 343 The Ninth Circuit therefore
affIrmed the District Court's denial of Global Crossing's judgment on the
pleadings and order allowing Metrophones to amend it complaint to
include breach of implied contract. 344 However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court's grant of leave to amend and include a claim
of negligence because it would extend Global Crossing's liability beyond
calls "for which the regulations make it responsible," which was
preempted under the Communication Act. 345
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hether 47
U.S.c. § 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 creates a private
right of action for a provider of payphone services to sue a long distance
carrier for alleged violations of the FCC's regulations concerning
compensation for coinless payphone calls.,,346 The Court ultimately
affIrmed the Ninth Circuit's decision because the FCC had acted lawfully
in its "unreasonable practice" interpretation of 47 U.S.c. § 201(b); thus,
because Global Crossing had violated the FCC's compensation
regulations, it was subject to suit in a district court under 47 U.S.C. §§
207 and 206. 347

47 U.S.C.A. §276(c).
342 Metrophones, 423 F.3d at 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
343 Id. at 1076-77.
344 Id. at 1079.
345 /d. at 1078.
341

346 Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 546
U.S. 1169 (2006) (petitioner writ of cert. 6 (Nov. 25, 2005».
347 Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550
U.S. _,127 S.O. 1513,1520 (2007).
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d. National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife

The conflict in National Association of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife arose from the interaction of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act)348 and
the Endangered Species Act. 349 In 1972, Congress passed the Clean
Water Act and established the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System. 350 Initially, permits for the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters were administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (hereafter "EPA,,).351 However, individual states could apply to
administer the permits for waters within its jurisdiction. 352 One year after
the Clean Water Act, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act. 353
To accomplish to goal of "conserv[ing] endangered species and
threatened species,,,354 substantive and procedural requirements were
placed on all federal agencies. 355 Under these requirements, if any
federal agency believes its actions or funding will endanger a listed
species or their habitat, the agency must consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service (hereafter "FWS,,).356 The FWS must then issue a
Biological Opinion determining whether the federal agency's action is
"likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or ...
[its] critical habitat.,,357 After the FWS issues a Biological Opinion, it is
the responsibility of the federal agency to proceed or not. 358
Because the Endangered Species Act interagency cooperation
requirements apply specifically to federal agencies, conflict arises when
a state's actions impact the Act. 359 For example, if a state receives water
pollution permit authority under the Clean Water Act, its subsequent
decisions do not require interagency cooperation under the Endangered
Species Act because the state is not a federal agency.

33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (Westlaw 2008).
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (Westlaw 2008).
350 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (adding the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act to the United States Code at 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1387).
351 33 U.S.C.A. § I 342(b) (Westlaw 2008).
352
1d.
348

349

353 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (adding the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 to the United States Code at 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1544).
354 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(c)(I) (Westlaw 2008).
355 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (Westlaw 2008).
356 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (Westlaw 2008). If the issue is a marine species, i.e., those species
who survive in water, then the National Marine Fisheries Service is substituted for the FWS.
357
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h (West law 2008)).
358 50 C.F.R. § 402.15 (Westlaw 2008)
359 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (Westlaw 2008).
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This is exactly what occurred in National Association of Home
Builders. In 2002, the State of Arizona became the forty-fifth state to
apply to administer the permits for discharging pollutants into its
navigable waters under the Clean Water Act. 360 Under the proposed
transfer, the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (hereafter
"ADEQ") would take over responsibility for issuing water pollution
permits from the EPA. 361Two days after the FWS released its Biological
Opinion, the EPA approved the transfer of permitting authority to the
State of Arizona and the ADEQ.362
Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer of permitting
authority in two lawsuits, consolidated before the Ninth Circuit. 363 The
Court of Appeals ultimately found that the EPA was under a duty and
had the power to determine if its transfer of permit authority to the
ADEQ would jeopardize protected species. 364 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals held that the EPA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it
made its decision. 365A petition for rehearing en banc was filed, but the
Ninth Circuit denied over the dissents of Judges Kozinski, O'Scannlain,
Kleinfeld, Tallman, Callahan, and Bea. 366 The Supreme Court reversed
the decision, siding with the EPA and the State of Arizona. 367 The Court
held that permit transfer authority was mandatory once a state "met the
criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the [Clean Water Act]" and the EPA was
therefore under no duty to adhere to § 7(a)(2)'s requirements. 368 The
Court also attacked the Ninth Circuit's "arbitrary and capricious" finding
by concluding that "the Ninth Circuit's determination ... [was] not fairly
supported by the record" and the Ninth Circuit should not usurp federal
agencies of the ability to explain and reconcile their decisions. 369

360 Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 420 F.3d 946,
952 (9th Cir. 2005) (Thompson, D., dissenting), en bane rehearing denied, 450 F.3d 394 (9th Cir.
2006).
361 Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 952 (Thompson, D., dissenting).
362
67 C.F.R. § 79629-01 (Westlaw 2008.
363 Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 954-55 (Thompson, D., dissenting) Petitioners in this
case were Defenders of Wildlife, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Craig Miller.
364 [d. at 969.
365 [d. at 962.

Defenders of Wildlife Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. E.P.A., 450 F.3d 394 (9th
Cir.2006).
367 National Ass' n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. 2518
(2007).
368 [d. at 2531-38.
369 [d. at 2529.
366
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e. Traveler's Casualty and Surety Company v. Pacific Gas and Electric
Corp.

In Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., the Supreme Court reviewed
whether contract-based claims for attorney fees incurred while litigating
issues of bankruptcy law were allowed under the Bankruptcy Code. 370
The Ninth Circuit had determined that Travelers could not recover
attorney fees because "attorney fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy
for litigating issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.,,371 The Supreme
Court reversed stating that the Bankruptcy Code did not prohibit
contract-based claims for attorney fees incurred litigating issues of
bankruptcy law because claims enforceable under state law are presumed
to "be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.,,372
The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly disallow
such claims, and in light of its prior decisions recognizing the propriety
of enforcing such claims, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision. 373
f. Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.

In Weyerhaeuser, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit's
determination that Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. 's standard for claims of predatory pricing did not apply to claims
of predatory bidding. 374 The Ninth Circuit had reasoned that the Brooke
Group standard, which requires showing that the conduct resulted in
below cost pricing of the predator's output and that the predator has a
dangerous probability of recouping losses from its predatory pricing
through a buyer monopoly power, should not apply to predatory bidding
claims because this practice "does not necessarily benefit consumers or
stimulate competition in the way that predatory pricing does.,,375

370 Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co. of America v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 549 U.S. _, 127
S.C!. 1199, 1202 (2007).
371 ld. at 1205 (2007) (internal quotation omitted); see also Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co. of
America v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 167 Fed. Appx. 593,594 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fobian v.
Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotations
omitted).
372
Travelers Cas., 127 S.Ct. at 1204, 1206 (2007).
373 ld. at 1206 (2007) (citing Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149 (1928)).
374 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct.
1069, 1072-73 (2007) (citing Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993)).
375 Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1072-73 (2007) (citing Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians
of Ore. V. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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Because the Supreme Court found that claims of predatory bidding
mirror claims of predatory pricing and these claims are similar in ways
deemed significant to the analysis in Brooke Group, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision and held that the Brooke Group standard did
apply to claims of predatory bidding. 376 The Court vacated the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 377

g. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. involves a
convoluted labyrinth of procedural history. It began when the state of
California and other plaintiffs (consolidated here as "California")
brought actions against several wholesale energy companies ("Reliant"
and "Duke") in state court, alleging that they engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy in violation of California's Cartwright Act and Unfair
Competition Law. 378 Reliant and Duke then filed cross-complaints for
indemnification, naming two American federal agencies, the Bonneville
Power Administration ("BPA") and the Western Area Power
Administration ("WAP A"), one corporation owned indirectly and one
entity directly owned by the Canadian Province of British Columbia,
respectively Powerex Corporation and the British Columbia Hydro and
Power Authority ("BC Hydro"), and one entity directly owned by
Mexico, the Comision de Federale Electicidad. 379 The Canadian entities
and American federal agencies removed the case to federal court.. Then
California sought to remand the case back to state court, but BPA,
WAP A, Powerex, and BC Hydro argued that they were either immune or
entitled to removal to federal court under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (hereafter "FSIA").
The District Court for the Southern District of California held that
BC Hydro, WAP A, and BP A were immune, but Powerex was not. 380
The court then remanded the case against Reliant and Duke to state
court. 381 Reliant and Duke appealed to the Ninth Circuit where
California first argued that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1446(d) which requires that a defendant seeking removal give
prompt notice to adverse parties and file a copy of the notice of removal
376/d.
377/d.

at 1076-77.
at 1078.

See California v. NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d lOll (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 1670, et seq., and 17200.
378

379

380

See NRC Energy, Inc., 391 F.3d at lOll.
See id. at 1022.

381/d.
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with the state court. 382 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument,
concluding that this limitation did not preclude its review of "substantive
issues of law.,,383 Because the case was more than about issues of
jurisdiction or procedural defects, the Ninth Circuit's appellate review
was not barred on jurisdictional grounds. With respect to BPA and
W AP A's sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the two agencies were immune because "only Congress can
waive immunity of a federal government agency.,,384 However, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision not to dismiss
the case against BPA and W AP A before it was remanded. 385
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that "BC Hydro
did not waive its sovereign immunity under the FSIA" for three
reasons. 386 First, BC Hydro's action "did not cause direct effects in the
United States within the meaning of the FSIA" because only Powerex's
decisions "affected the California markets.,,387 Second, BC Hydro's
activities (e.g., flood control, managing fisheries, constructing dams)
were those typically government responsibilities. 388 Lastly, while BC
Hydro and Powerex may have cooperated as parent and subsidiary, the
lack of control was sufficient to find no agent/principal existed. 389
The Ninth Circuit again agreed with the district court that Powerex
was "not a foreign instrumentality under FSIA" for several reasons. 390
Turning to the "organ" test of the FSIA, Powerex was not immune for
several reasons. 391
Because Powerex acted as an independent
commercial enterprise and the Canadian government did not fund nor
compensate Powerex for its losses, the court distinguished its recent
decision in EIE Guam. 392 The court then analogized Patrickson v. Dole
Foods Co. and quashed any degree of Powerex's public purpose by the
separation from the Canadian government. 393 Finally, Powerex did not
qualify for immunity under the ownership exception of the FSIA because
382/d.

1d.
Id. at 1023.
385 NRG Energy, Inc., 391 F.3d at 1026-27.
386 Id. at 1025.
387 /d. at 1024.
388
1d.
383

384

389

Id.

Id. at 1026.
391 28 V.S.C.A. § 1603(b)(2) (Westlaw 2008).
392 NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d at 1025-26 (distinguishing EIE Guam Corporation v. Long
Term Credit Bank of Japan, 322 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 2003)).
393 NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d at 1026 (applying Partickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795
(9th Cir. 2001), affd on other grounds 538 V.S. 468 (2003)).
390
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BC Hydro, and not the Canadian government, owned a majority of its
corporate shares. 394
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Powerex's
immunity under the "organ" theory and also directed the parties to "brief
and argue ... whether the [Ninth Circuit] had jurisdiction to review the
district court's remand order.,,395 The Court ultimately concluded that
the district court had made its decision based on subject-matter
jurisdiction; therefore, the Ninth Circuit's appellate review authority was
barred by 28 U.S.c. §1447(d).396

II.

UNRAVELLING COMMON THREADS

The Supreme Court's review of Ninth Circuit cases during the
latter's October 2006 term suggests several common themes. First, there
appears to be a difference between the courts with respect to federalism.
As discussed above, it appears that the Supreme Court, unlike the Ninth
Circuit, took a state-deferential position, in so far as it relates to the
punishment of criminals. But this stance was not isolated in the area of
prisoners' rights. In National Ass'n of Home Builders, the two courts'
decisions again had converse impacts on the relationship between federal
and state power. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the difficulties
involved in rescinding Arizona's permit issuing authority, the court
nevertheless found against the EPA and the State of Arizona. Despite
the fact that the EPA is a federal agency, the holding was still favorable
to the federal government because it directly challenged Arizona's
permit issuing authority. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed and
found in favor of the EPA and the State of Arizona. Thus when it came
to prisoners' rights and environmental law, the Supreme Court favored
state power; whereas the Ninth Circuit favored a dominant federal
authority. 397
Conversely, in the areas of immigration and business law, either
there was no difference between the courts or the Supreme Court
favored broader federal power. In Global Crossing, both courts allowed
two state law claims to succeed in the face of a clear federal preemption
394

NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d at 1026.
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. 55 I U.S. _ , 127 S.Ct. I 144 (2007).
396 Id. at2417.

395

397 See also Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's
Questfor Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217,217 (2004) (arguing that a review of cases since
1970 "demonstrates that the Court's current majority ... gives substantially more weight ... to Anti·
Federalist views.").
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statute; however, the Supreme Court's holding seems to have empowered
a federal agency-the FCC. Turning to the immigration cases, the
Supreme Court broadly interpreted federal immigration laws.
In
Resendiz-Ponce the Court held that non-particularized pleadings were
sufficient, and in Duenas-Alvarez the Court held that a permanent
resident alien who violated California's code provision prohibiting aiding
and abetting automobile theft would be subject to removal proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit, however, had taken a view which strictly interpreted
the federal immigration laws. This view would have essentially limited
federal power, but, as previously noted, the Supreme Court reversed both
of these cases.
In addition to the disparity over federalism, the two courts
struggled with the rights of businesses in three cases. 398 These cases can
be further subdivided into classes where individuals and businesses were
in conflict with one another, and where businesses clashed with
themselves. In Becks, the Ninth Circuit found the existence of a duty
under ERISA to the detriment of the business entity. The Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion to the detriment of the individual
employees. In Safeco, the Ninth Circuit, in a holding favorable to
consumers, reversed a summary judgment order and indicated that
liability under the FCRA could be found. While the Supreme Court
agreed with the Court of Appeal's standards, the Court spared GEICO
and Safeco from liability through a new baseline measure and an
objectively reasonable standard for interpreting the Act which stand to
protect insurance companies from liability under the FCRA. Taken
together, Becks and Safeco suggest that the Ninth Circuit favors
employees and consumers when in conflict with businesses, while the
Supreme Court seemed inclined in favor of employers and merchants
when they are in conflict with individuals.
In the second category of business right cases, where businesses
are in conflict with each other, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
seemed to be in agreement. In Global Crossing a payphone service
provider sought to enforce compensation from long distance carriers for
dial-around calls. Both the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court upheld the
right of action under 47 U.S.c. § 20ICb), but the holdings are fairly
narrow. As a result it is not clear if the two courts are truly in agreement
with inter-business conflicts, or if this case was unique in its limited
holding.
398 For purposes of this subsection, "business" encompasses the entire gambit of entities
engaged in some form of commerce. While Powerex is arguably a business law cases, the issue
between the two courts was a procedural and jurisdictional one. Therefore it does not lend its hand
to any analysis of business or individual rights.
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Overall the fact that the Supreme Court's preference for business
rights over individuals fits with the Court's consistent treatment of
individual liberties in other cases. In the Constitutional law cases
discussed above, the Supreme Court has disavowed individual rights and
civil liberties that the Ninth Circuit had previously determined to exist.
The Supreme Court has also continued to take an active role in
centralizing a federal view of individual rights, or the lack thereof,
instead of allowing the States to determine the limits.
The Supreme Court's review of Ninth Circuit cases suggests that
the Supreme Court's analysis with respect to federalism is becoming
more state-centric. 399 The Court has been decentralizing government
power and distributing the power back to the states. 400 Unsurprisingly,
this framework fits nicely into the Supreme Court's and the Ninth
Circuit's analyses of habeas petitions described above. 401 The Ninth
Circuit's review of federal habeas petitions from state prisoners indicates
a pro-federal viewpoint in this area. 402 The Supreme Court's review of
these same cases, however, indicates that the Court is moving towards a
decentralized view of federalism. As noted above, the Court has been
progressively decentralizing government power, and the October 2006
term suggests that this is likely to continue.
III.

CONCLUSION

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's thyroid cancer diagnosis in
2004 and the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 2005 fueled
speculation about the future make-up of the Supreme Court. 403 President
George W. Bush was given the rare opportunity to nominate two
replacement Supreme Court Justices only months apart. Chief Justice
John Roberts eventually took the bench on September 29, 2005 to
replace Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Associate Justice Samuel Alita
succeeded Justice O'Connor when he took the bench on January 31,
2006.404 The confirmation of these two new Justices gave rise to
399 See Patrick M. Garry, Liberty From On High: The Growing Reliance on a Centralized
Judiciary to Protect Individual Liberty, 95 Ky. L.1. 385, 387 (2006) (citing ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE
IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 12 (200 I)).
400 See id. at 387.
401 See sectIOn
. I , supra.
402 See section I(B),supra.
403 William N. LaForge, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Remembered, FEDERAL LAWYER,
26, at 27(October 2005); Justice Sandra Day O'Connor letter to President Bush, July I, 2005; see
e.g., 58 STAN. L. REv., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, April 2006.
404 Biographies
of the Current Justices of the Supreme Court, available at
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anticipation regarding the level of conservatism being added to the
Court, and this anticipation led up to the October 2006 term -the fIrst full
introduction to the "new" Supreme Court.
While many of the major cases decided in this term fell to a 5-4
vote, the 5-4 voting patterns rarely changed, and, as anticipated, the
majority bloc-comprising Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito-tended to vote conservatively.405T his put
Justice Kennedy in a position of power as the new swing vote, becoming
Justice O'Connor's replacement in that respect. Justice Kennedy not
only voted with the majority in every 5-4 decision this term, but he also
dissented only twice.4D6 This majority bloc similarly controlled the cases
on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit. In eighteen of the twenty Ninth
Circuit cases addressed in this Comment, the controlling bloc of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito were in
the majority.407
Notably, two members of the current majority bloc have previously
expressed a negative view of the Ninth Circuit. In 1998 Justice Antonin
Scalia twice wrote to the White Commission which ultimately
recommended splitting the Ninth Circuit. Justice Scalia noted the
"incomplete and random nature of [the Ninth Circuit's] en banc panel,"
along with the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate. 408 He also concluded
that the Ninth Circuit has a "singularly (and I had thought notoriously)
poor record on appeal.,,409 Justice Anthony Kennedy also expressed a
www.supremecourtus.gov (last visited Mar. 19,2008).
405 Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Different a Single Justice
Can Make: The 2006·2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHITnER L. REV. I, 2
(2007). Twenty-four outour of sixty-eight cases this term were decided on a 5-4 vote. Id. at 6.
Dean Chemerinsky has gone so far as to say that "the central message of the Supreme Court's 2006
Tenn" is that "[clonservatives finally got their Court." Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the
Right, 10 GREEN BAG 20423,423 (2007).
406 Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Different a Single Justice
Can Make: The 2006·2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHIlTIER L. REV. I, 3
(2007).
407 The only cases from the Ninth Circuit that do not fit into this pattern are: Global Crossing
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 1513
(2007) (8-1 with Scalia dissenting) and United States v. Resendiz·Ponce, 549 U.S. _,127 S.Ct. 782
(2007) (8-1 with Scalia dissenting).
408 Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Hon. Byron R. White, Chair, White Commission I
(Aug.
21,
1998),
available
at
http://
www.library .unt.edu/gpo/csafcalhearingslsubmitted/pdflScalia I.pdf ("Justice Scalia Letter # I");
Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Hon. Byron R. White, Chair, White Commission 2 (Sept. 9,
1998), available at http:// www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafcalhearings/submitted/pdflScalia2.pdf
("Justice Scalia Letter #2").
409 Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Hon. Byron R. White, Chair, White Commission 2
(Sept.
9,
1998),
available
at
http://
www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafcalhearingslsubmitted/pdflScalia2.pdf ("Justice Scalia Letter #2").
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similar view, even after having served on the Ninth Circuit before his
appointment to the Supreme Court. 4l OWriting in support of splitting the
Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy said that, "[w]hat began as an experiment
should not become the status quo when it has not yielded real success ...
[i]n my view, the judicial system would be better served if the states of
the present Ninth Circuit were to comprise more circuits than one.,,411
While these comments are not, of themselves, predictive of how
these Justices or the Court might review cases on review from the Ninth
Circuit, they do suggest that Justices Scalia and Kennedy have long held
feelings about the general quality of the decisions issued by the Ninth
Circuit. The decision issued by the Supreme Court during the October
2006 term do nothing to suggest either that the two Justices have
changed their views, or that their view is not shared by other Justices. To
the contrary, the October 2006 term indicates that generally speaking,
there are a number of fundamental differences of outlook between the
two courts on key concepts. The October 2006 term suggests that such
divergences are likely to continue to occur until the Ninth Circuit is split
or the composition of either court changes significantly.
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